Daily Development for Tuesday,
April 4, 2000
By: Patrick A. Randolph,
Jr.
Professor of Law
UMKC School of Law
Of Counsel: Blackwell Sanders Peper Martin
Kansas City, Missouri
randolphp@umkc.edu
LENDER LIABILITY; LOAN
PROCEEDS; DISBURSEMENT: Indiana court concludes that mortgagee has no liability
when, with knowledge of an outstanding potential lien claimant, it disburses proceeds
to contractor and accepts an affidavit that all potential lienors have been
paid. (But it's a close call.)
Town and Country
HomeCenter v. Woods, No. 54A01-9903-CV-89 (Ind. App. 4/4/00) http://www.ai.org/judiciary/opinions/completed/04040003.jgb.html
Lender had agreed to fund
Borrower's acquisition of a newly completed house. Woods was the vendor of the
house and the contractor. T&C was supplying materials for the construction,
which preceded the loan funding. Lender's loan would "take out" the
construction lender and compensate Woods for the balance of the purchase price.
Prior to the loan closing,
T & C sent Borrower a "pre lien" appraising Borrower that lender
had supplied materials for construction and was entitled to a mechanic's lien
if it was not paid. Borrower took the notice to a loan officer at Lender, who
told Borrower not to worry about notice, because such things were taken care of
at closing.
Indeed, at closing, Lender
asked Woods about the T&C account, and Woods readily admitted that T&C
had not yet been paid, but told Lender that he, Woods, would pay T&C with
monies he received from Lender at closing (monies debited to Borrower's loan
account.) Lender required Woods to sign
a letter indicating that all lienable claims had been paid prior to closing,
although, as indicated, Woods had admitted that this was not true. It then
disbursed the loan proceeds, taking out the construction loan and paying the
bulk of the proceeds to Woods, based upon his contract. Borrower was aware of
this procedure and agreed to it.
Predictably, Woods never
paid T&C and apparently now lacks funds to do so. T&C, however, did not
timely file its mechanic's lien, and was left without a lien against the home. It
then sought recourse from lender, alleging, inter alia, that it was a third
party beneficiary of the fiduciary obligation of the Lender to the Borrower to see
to it potential construction liens are paid at closing out of loan proceeds. This
common law duty toward Borrower, apparently an implied term of the loan
agreement, has been recognized in several Indiana cases and is affirmed here.
The majority opinion held
that although there may have been a duty to the Borrower relating to potential
lien claimants, and that if T&C did have a lien, the bank would have a duty
to release it in order to protect borrower. But that duty did not extend to all
parties who supplied goods or services during construction. In particular, it
would not apply here in any event because T&C was in fact not a potential
lien claimant, having blown the timing of the lien filing.
The court acknowledged
that, in addition to the special relationship obligation of the bank to the
Borrower, there was the argument that the statement by the Lender's officer
that the T&C letter would be "taken care of" at closing had the
potential to create a contractual relationship between Lender and Borrower. But
the court found that the statement was not clear enough to create such a
contract, and in any event T&C, which was not in fact a creditor of
Borrower's and had no lien claim, was not an intended beneficiary of any such
contract. T&C then argued that there was fraud or even criminal deception
in the Lender's action in inducing Woods to sign a false lien affidavit. The majority
opinion concluded that T&C had not relied upon the affidavit, in fact did
not even know of it at the time, and consequently had no claim as a victim of
fraud. Similarly, the crime of deception requires that as a consequence of
deception a party be induced to part with something of value. The Lender was
the only party that parted with anything here - the loan proceeds. It couldn't
commit a crime against itself, so there was no deception.
So far pretty cut and
dried, and a result to be expected in most jurisdictions. But note that we are
so far discussing only the majority opinion. Apparently we had a three judge
panel here, and each judge filed a separate opinion.
The concurring judge
agreed with the outcome of the majority opinion, but only with great regret. It
advocated for a change in Indiana law to permit recovery in circumstances like
those here. It pointed out that the bank's practices were a radical departure
from typical practice, in which a check would have been cut in the joint names
of the Contractor and T&C when the Lender had notice that T&C had not
been paid. In the view of the concurring judge, the conduct of the Lender here
was "reprehensible and indefensible. . . Such conduct represents a total
disregard for the interests of persons known to have an interest in the
proceeds of the real estate closing and in addition flies in the face of well
established custom and practice within the lending industry." The
concurring judge noted that T&C, an innocent third party, was deprived of
the payment of its just debt by the Lender's conduct and maintained that justice
demanded that the Bank be responsible for T&C's losses. But the court saw
no basis for such recovery under the present state of Indiana law, so he
concurred in the majority outcome. He urged the Supreme Court of Indiana, to
take up the issue and create a duty of parties holding funds in trust for
payment of debts to see to it that the funds are properly used, which duty
would run to the creditors themselves.
The third judge filed a
dissenting opinion. This judge
concluded that a duty was created at the mortgage closing when Lender obtained knowledge
of the money owed T&C for building materials. Where the relationship of the
parties creates a justifiable reliance upon one of them and the circumstances
are completely controlled by the party relied upon, a duty to use reasonable
care exists.
This judge maintained that
the operative principle ought to be that: "courts will find a duty where .
. . reasonable persons would recognize it and agree that it exists." It
was of the view that reasonable persons would have no problem here, as T&C,
though it never relied upon lenders actions at closing, did have a fair claim
for compensation of which it was deprived when Lender negligently misdisursed
the funds. The dissenter noted that: A relationship that gives rise to a duty
does not necessarily have to emanate from a contract. "In determining
whether a legal duty arises, consideration must be given to the nature of the
relationship between people and whether the party being charged with negligence
had knowledge of the situation or circumstances surrounding that
relationship"
Although T&C had no
knowledge of what the Lender was doing, the dissenting judge concludes that a
loss to T&C was a forseeable consequence of Lender's departure from
standard good lending practices.
Comment: The Lender had
its own reasons for controlling disbursements so as to avoid mechanic's liens. Most
courts recognize that these reasons are sufficient, and that in controlling the
proceeds Lenders undertake duties to no one but themselves.
Although a few
jurisdictions, like, apparently, Indiana, seem to want to impose a duty on
lenders to supervise loan proceeds for the benefit of borrower, most loan
contracts provide specifically that there is no such duty, as the supervision
of disbursement is for the lender's own benefit only.
But even if the borrower
was in a "special relationship," and was protected implicitly by a
fiduciary duty or other duty of care, is it appropriate to reach even further
and extend that duty of care to third party material suppliers?
The argument seems
particularly strained here, where the real reason for the loss was the fact
that the supplier did not take advantage of statutory procedures to file a
mechanic's lien - a method which would have provided protection for the
material;s supplier and indeed would have focussed upon the obligation of the
bank - at this point likely owed to the borrower under Indiana law - to pay
that lien off straightaway.
Readers are urged to respond, comment, and argue with the daily development
or the editor's comments about it.
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