Daily Development
forTuesday, April 18, 2000
By: Patrick A. Randolph,
Jr.
Professor of Law
UMKC School of Law
Of Counsel: Blackwell Sanders Peper Martin
Kansas City, Missouri
randolphp@umkc.edu
DEEDS; DESCRIPTION:
Statement voiced as exception to warranty in deed that grantor had earlier
conveyed three quarters mineral interest to another controls the intent of the
parties, and grantee receives only one quarter interest even though in fact the
grantor's statement of the earlier conveyance was erroneous.
Knight v. Minter, 1999
Miss. LEXIS 364 (11/24/99)
Apparently in order to
avoid the impact of the deed warranty in a deed that ransferred fee title to
certain lands, the deed stated, in relevant part: "it is understood by the
grantee herein that I have heretofore sold threefourths (3/4) of all mineral
interest [in part of the land conveyed under the deed]." In fact, the
grantor had previously conveyed away only a one quarter mineral interest in
that land. The lower court found that the grantor retained the remaining one
half mineral interest, as it had not been conveyed earlier and did not pass
under the deed in question.
The Supreme Court,
affirming the lower court, held that the issue is not the truthfulness of the
recitals in the deed but the intent of the parties. The court stated that it
was unambiguously the intent of the parties that the grantee receive only a
onequarter interest in the minerals. Moreover, it would be inequitable to
enloarge this interest from a one quarter to a three quarter interest since the
grantee had paid only for a one quarter interest.
The court's discussion of
the precedents is interesting. In Miller v. Lowery, 468 So. 2d 865 (Miss.
1985), Miller, owning fee simple title to a tract of land, conveyed it to Pace,
using a warranty deed containing the following clause: "subject to the
reservation of all oil, gas and other minerals in, on and under the above
described land by prior grantors." There were no such reservations by any
prior grantors. Miller claimed that the "subject to" language in her
conveyance to Pace severed the mineral rights and reserved them in her favor.
The Mississippi Supreme Court, however, ruled that because the mineral rights
had not previously been severed, the clause did not reserve them in her favor,
but rather only protected her warranty of title. In Wilson v. Gerard, 213 Miss.
177, 56 So. 2d 471 (1952), however, Gerard conveyed a tract of land to Wilson
by warranty deed containing the following language: "subject to onehalf
interest in mineral and oil rights as conveyed to William Henderson. No such
conveyance to Henderson had ever been made, and because of this, Wilson argued
that this onehalf ( 1/2 ) interest became vested in him through the warranty deed.
This Court disagreed, holding that title "remained in the Gerards and the
conveyance to a nonexistent grantee would have left the title remaining in the
said grantors." "An exception will be good as to property recited to
have been previously sold or conveyed, although the recital is false."
The instant court
reconciled these cases as follows:
The difference in the Miller case, on which Knight relies, and the
Wilson case, on which the Shows Heirs rely, is in the specificity of the
reservation clauses. In Miller, the clauses used vague language such as
"subject to all prior reservations," while the reservation clause in
Wilson specifically set out the fixed amount of the reservation (i.e. onehalf
interest). In distinguishing its case from Wilson the Miller Court stated that
in Wilson, "the grantee thus received what he bargained for. Wilson is
distinguishable from the case at bar in that it deals with a specific
exception. Although the same 'subject to' language was used in Wilson, the specificity
of the reservation presents a factually distinguishable situation."
Comment 1: The case is
hard to dispute as to result. But is the court wise to preserve the Miller
precedent? Did the grantor in that case really intend to convey the mineral
rights, and did the grantee really expect to receive them?
Comment 2: The court's
argument relating to consideration appears to be a sidetrack. The issue of
consideration, in fact, may not have been relevant at the time of the grant,
since the parties may not have anticipated that the mineral rights had much
value, but nevertheless there is no question as to the grantor's intent with
respect to the deed.
P7. at 867. "When certain tracts excepted are specifically
described, and it is further recited that they have been previously sold or
conveyed, the exception will be good, although the recital is false since it may
be rejected, or although the prior conveyance did not effectuate a transfer of
the property described therein, or even though the property previously conveyed
reverts to the grantor by reason of the grantee in the prior conveyance ceasing
to use it for the purpose prescribed in the deed." Oldham v. Fortner, 221
Miss. 732, 741, 74 So. 2d 824, 828 (1954) (quoting 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 139 c,
page 450.)
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development or the editor's comments about it.
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