Daily Development for Friday, April 4, 2003
by: Patrick A. Randolph, Jr.
Elmer F. Pierson Professor of Law
UMKC School of Law
Of Counsel: Blackwell Sanders Peper Martin
Kansas City, Missouri
dirt@umkc.edu

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DUE PROCESS; NOTICE; TAX
FORECLOSURES: New York Court of Appeals upholds tax
foreclosure where mailed notice was returned and county did not check
"ordinary sources" for alternative addresses.

Mosssafa v. Kleiman, 2003 WL 443797 (N.Y. 2/25/03)

As most real estate lawyers know, constitutional due process requires
notice and opportunity for a hearing before government can take away
property, even when the governmental action is a tax foreclosure.
Although there hasn't been a lot of judicial discussion of what constitutes
a proper opportunity for a hearing in the tax foreclosure context, there
has been some important law on the question of notice.  In the noted U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Mennonite Board of Missionaries, 462 U.S.
791 (1983), the Court ruled that the Mullane standard of constitutional
notice applied - "notice reasonably calculated, under the all
circumstances, to apprise . . . ."

Here, when the property owner acquired the property, she registered an
address with the County.  The property owner later changed her address.
She claimed that she notified the County of the address change, but could
not produce the letter (not surprisingly) and in fact the County did not
change her address on its records.   The County continued to send the
bills to the address on its records, and indeed, in every year from 1983-
1998, property owner paid the taxes, except in 1996.  Several of the
letters by which the property owner paid her taxes had the correct address
as the return address, and the checks had the correct address.

In 1996, there was no tax payment.  This occasioned the County, in its
1998 tax bill, to put on the bill a warning that back taxes had not been
paid and that there was a risk of a foreclosure if payment was not made.
The 1998 taxes were paid, but there was no payment of the delinquent
1996 taxes.

The County initiated a tax foreclosure.  The applicable law required
notice of the foreclosure to be sent to owners whose property interest was
a matter of public record at the time of the delinquent taxes and "whose
name and address are reasonably ascertainable from the public record,
including the records in the office of the surrogate of the county."  The
County sent notice to the same address it had been using all along - that
shown on its tax rolls.  This time the post office returned the notice with
the notation: "not deliverable as addressed unable to forward."

The County made no further search and obtained a default judgment of
foreclosure.  A purchaser bid $8000 at the auction, far in excess of the
$605.44 tax delinquency, and the County retained the surplus.   The
statutory redemption period ran, and thereafter the purchaser at the tax
foreclosure sale sought to quiet title, leading to this action.

Property owner (or, more accurately at this point, former property owner)
argued that when the County received back the returned letter indicating
that notice had not been effected, it had an obligation to take ordinary
steps to ascertain her correct address, such as to look in the telephone
book or the internet.

The New York Court of Appeals disagreed.  Although it acknowledged
that, by statute, the County had a duty to look at more than the tax rolls,
it stated that the property owner had not demonstrated that it would have
found her address in public records in the surrogate's office.  It rejected
her claim that the letters and checks by which she had paid earlier bills
provided notice to the County, since there was no requirement or
expectation that the County would use these for notice address
verification and, indeed, the County did not keep them.

The Court's critical ruling, of course, was on the question of whether the
County had a duty to go beyond the surrogate's office.  It rejected such a
proposition:

     "As an initial matter, we reject the view that the enforcing
     officer's obligation is always satisfied by sending the notice to the
     address listed in the tax role, even where the notice is returned as
     undeliverable.  In such cases, the enforcing officer is in no
     different position than if an initial examination of the roll had
     yielded no address.  Generally, when the notice is returned as
     undeliverable, the tax district should conduct a reasonable search
     of the public record. . . . A reasonable search of the public record,
     however, does not necessarily require searching the Internet,
     voting records, motor vehicle records, the telephone book or
     similar resource."

The court does not explain why it reach the somewhat surprising
conclusion that there is no duty even to look for the address in other
readily available public records not in the Surrogate's Office.  It admits
that the County cannot rely upon the notice of default that it appears
likely that property owner did receive.  This is not notice of foreclosure.
Nevertheless, the court points to this notice, together with the fact that
other notices sent to the address in the record, both before and after the
1996 default notice, apparently did reach property owner, since she
regularly paid taxes billed to that address.  The owner's carelessness in
not changing the record address, despite the fact that she in fact received
many letters sent to the wrong address, was a factor the court took into
consideration:

     "While to an owner who has not abandoned his or her property,
     learning of its foreclosure is distressing - particularly when the
     tax due constituted a minuscule percentage of the market value of
     the property - the owner's interest must be balanced against the
     State's interest in collecting delinquent taxes, taking into account
     the status and conduct of the owner in determining whether
     notice was reasonable."   (emphasis added)

Later, the court expanded on this notion:

     "When th conduct of a party does not excuse the collecting
     officer from providing notice to those whose contact information
     is reasonably ascertainable, it is nevertheless relevant in
     determining whether the party's contact information was
     reasonably ascertainable."

Comment:   The Editor admits to being a person of tender sensibilities,
but the Editor is shocked by this result. The editor understands that there
is an argument for "mass due process" here.  Public agencies can't be
required to be overly punctilious at taxpayer's expense.  "Reasonable" is
good enough.  Therefore, it may be admitted that the County need not
have checked outside of the public records.  There are many phone books
these days and they are changed frequently, and if we required phone
book checking, we'd have to decide which phone book was sufficient.
Further, the County need not be required to have an Internet adept on its
foreclosure staff.  But why is it all that great a burden to at least check
the voting records or other records that contained address at which public
agencies regularly had been able to reach the property owner?

The court qualifies its outcome, of course, by stressing the special
circumstances here - that there was evidence that other mail got through,
perhaps putting into doubt the bona fides of property owner's claim that
the foreclosure notice didn't in fact reach her.  But the blanket statement
that there is no requirement to go beyond the limited records available in
one public office when a potentially ruinous tax foreclosure is at hand
establishes precedent that difficult to distinguish away.  It seems to the
Editor that the court has overreached here.  Tax foreclosures aren't so
numerous that a little more caution isn't in order when the potential
consequences of an unnoticed foreclosure are so severe.

Readers are encouraged to respond to or criticize this posting.

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