Daily Development for
Monday, July 31, 2000
By: Patrick A. Randolph,
Jr.
Professor of Law
UMKC School of Law
Of Counsel: Blackwell Sanders Peper Martin
Kansas City, Missouri
randolphp@umkc.edu
DEEDS; DESCRIPTION: Where
a grantor conveys property by warranty deed containing language "excepting
that portion" of a right-of-way, the grantor retains that portion of the
property over which a right-of-way runs.
Tri-County Metropolitan
Trans. Dist. of Oregon v. Portland General Elec. Co., 985 P.2d 222 (Or. Ct.
App. 1999).
Rachel Hawthorn owned a
farm, and granted to Oregon Electric Railway ("OER") an easement over
the farm to permit OER to run rail service. Hawthorn subsequently conveyed her
property to Harold Ray, and Ray then sold his property to Hawthorn Farm Company
by a warranty deed which contained language "excepting that portion"
of a right-of-way referring to the OER easement. Hawthorn Farm Company
eventually sold the property to Quadrant Corporation.
The Tri-County
Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon initiated condemnation
proceedings to acquire the OER easement and named Ray's heirs and Quadrant as
defendants. The heirs and Quadrant moved for summary judgment as to the
competing ownership claims. The trial court concluded that Ray never intended
to retain title to the narrow strip underlying the OER easement notwithstanding
the excepting clause, and entered judgment in favor of Quadrant. The Court of
Appeals of Oregon reversed the trial court. The Court determined that Ray
intended to grant title to everything except the land on which the OER easement
lay from the excepting clause in the conveyancing deed from Ray to Quadrant
because excepting clauses generally have the effect of taking something out of
the thing granted that would have otherwise passed by the deed.
Comment 1: It is often
useful to refer to existing easements when drafting deeds, since the grantor
usually wants to avoid warranting title free of them. But the questions
frequently arises whether such an exception is an exception to the warranty or
an exception to the conveyance entirely. Probably, in virtually every case, the
true intent of the parties is to transfer the potential future reversion of the
easement along with the rest of the property. But, as this case indicates, it
is not uncommon to read the language of the deed more narrowly.
In this case, it was
doubly difficult to read the exception language as applying only to the
warranty because there was other language in the deed following the warranty
that expressly identified this easement, among others, and excepted them from
the warranty. It may be, then, that in this case the grantor indeed intended to
reserve the reversion. But was the grantee really aware of that?
This case involves a
condemnation proceeding involving a railroad right of way. More often, the
question is ownership after the right of way is abandoned. In either case, many
railroad rights of way are substantial in size and potentially quite valuable. Here
the easement was as much as 60 feet wide. Further, it may yet prove that there
will be gold in those reversionary interests when telecommunications operators
lay cable along them (the editor has expressed his doubts on this point, but
has been wrong before.)
Comment 2: Here are prior
cases reported in the Quarterly Reports dealing with this same issue:
DEEDS; CONSTRUCTION; EXCEPTIONS: Concepts "excepting and
reserving" are inconsistent, and grantor wishing to retain some rights in
the property should use one term or the other, but not both. Campbell v. Johnson, 622 N.E. 2d 717 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1993). In the case of a reservation, the whole title to the property
conveyed passes to the grantee, but the grantee reserves to itself some benefit
of the real estate; by contrast, in the case of an exception, the grantor
retains title to the excepted part, and the grantee takes title to the real
estate less the exception. Here, in construing deed language that conveyed land
"excepting and reserving" a roadway leading to a landlocked parcel,
the court relied upon the intention of the parties in the light of the circumstances
of the case. The court noted that where the intention of the parties cannot be
clearly established, the exception or reservation in a conveyance is to be
construed in favor of the grantee rather than of the grantor. For another
interesting case involving language of reservation, see Cantley v. Hubbard, 623
So.2d 1079 (Ala. 1993),(Deed language stating the grantor reserved "all
mineral reserved to the United States" was a reservation of all mineral
rights, and not solely the coal rights that the United States had reserved in a
prior grant.)
DEEDS; DESCRIPTIONS; RIGHT OF WAY: A warranty deed reserving or excepting a "right of way"
reserves fee interest and not an easement in the right of way. Harris v. Ski
Park Farms, Inc., 844 P.2d 1006 (Wash. 1993). Comment: Although this case is
simple to state, as a state supreme court holding it is an important precedent
on an issue that is often problematic in deed interpretation. Also see: Grill
v. West Virginia Railroad Maintenance Authority, 423 S.E.2d 893 (W. Va. 1992).
(Deed purporting to convey "a strip of land for a right-of-way"
created a fee simple grant, not merely an easement. The language regarding use
is merely descriptive.)
DEEDS; CONSTRUCTION: In
construing a conveyance, a court ascertains the intent of the parties from the
four corners of the instrument, giving consideration to each part and viewed in
light of the circumstances leading up to its execution, and the presence of
language in proximity to the warranty clause as opposed to elsewhere in the
deed does not determine intent conclusively. Boswell Energy Corp. v. Arrowhead
Homes, Inc., 976 P.2d 1113 (Okla. Ct. App. 1999).
The McCalebs conveyed two
parcels of property by warranty deed to Arrowhead Homes, Inc., a corporation
they formed for the purpose of developing a subdivision of residential homes. In
both deeds, there was language inserted between the warranty clause and before
the habendum clause language excepting from the conveyance all mineral
interests.
Boswell Energy Corp.
("Boswell") acquired an oil and gas lease of the two parcels, and
PetroCorp acquired an oil and gas lease on the same parcels from Arrowhead's
successors in interest. Boswell brought a quiet title action to determine who
has title to the minerals and the leasehold. The trial court entered judgment
in favor of the McCalebs and Boswell.
On appeal, PetroCorp argued
that the insertion of the language below the warranty clause merely excepted
the mineral rights from the warranty and did not reserve the mineral interests
in the McCalebs. Applying the rule that a court must discern the intent of the
parties from the four corners of the instrument, the Court of Civil Appeals of
Oklahoma found that there was an ambiguity in the deed. Therefore, the Court
reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for extrinsic evidence as to
the McCalebs' intent.
DEEDS; CONSTRUCTION: In
construing a conveyance, a court ascertains the intent of the parties from the
four corners of the instrument, giving consideration to each part and viewed in
light of the circumstances leading up to its execution, and the presence of language
in proximity to the warranty clause as opposed to elsewhere in the deed does
not determine intent conclusively. Boswell Energy Corp. v. Arrowhead Homes,
Inc., 976 P.2d 1113 (Okla. Ct. App. 1999).
The McCalebs conveyed two
parcels of property by warranty deed to Arrowhead Homes, Inc., a corporation
they formed for the purpose of developing a subdivision of residential homes. In
both deeds, there was language inserted between the warranty clause and before
the habendum clause language excepting from the conveyance all mineral
interests.
Boswell Energy Corp.
("Boswell") acquired an oil and gas lease of the two parcels, and
PetroCorp acquired an oil and gas lease on the same parcels from Arrowhead's
successors in interest. Boswell brought a quiet title action to determine who
has title to the minerals and the leasehold. The trial court entered judgment
in favor of the McCalebs and Boswell.
On appeal, PetroCorp
argued that the insertion of the language below the warranty clause merely
excepted the mineral rights from the warranty and did not reserve the mineral
interests in the McCalebs. Applying the rule that a court must discern the
intent of the parties from the four corners of the instrument, the Court of
Civil Appeals of Oklahoma found that there was an ambiguity in the deed. Therefore,
the Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for extrinsic
evidence as to the McCalebs' intent.
Readers are urged to respond, comment, and argue with
the daily development or the editor's comments about it.
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