Again, the editor has concluded that neither of these
tidbits makes a full meal, so they're combined.
Daily Development for Wednesday, July 11, 2001
By: Patrick A.
Randolph, Jr.
Professor of Law
UMKC School of Law
Of Counsel: Blackwell Sanders Peper Martin
Kansas City, Missouri
prandolph@cctr.umkc.edu
VENDOR/PURCHASER; DUTIES OF SELLER; ROADS: Where Seller
agrees to "construct a fifty (50) foot wide road for a public and private
access road . . . and shall either dedicate said . . . road to public use or
provide Buyer [and others] a non exclusive perpetual easement . . . ,"
Seller's obligation is actually to build a road, not just dedicate an easement,
and that road must be fifty feet in width, even if, under county standards,
this would require a considerably larger easement dedication.
A & F. Properties, LLC v.Lake Caroline, 775 So. 2d 1276
(Miss. 2000)
The court in fact conceded that the party's agreement as to
the width of the road was ambiguous, but upheld the jury's determination that
an actual fifty-foot wide road was intended.
The Seller had constructed a 28 foot wide road, allowing fifty feet for the public easement. The court noted that it did not matter that
the easement had to be wider than fifty feet if the road was dedicated to the
public, which was one permitted possibility under the contract language.
Note: The case has
an interesting discussion of damages.
The jury had found zero damages, which the court found untenable in
light of its conclusion that a fifty-foot wide road was intended. It agreed
that there might be zero damages if the narrower road was equally valuable to
the Buyer as the intended wider road, but indicated that there was no evidence
that the road was satisfactory or that plaintiffs were not damaged by the
narrower road. The court, therefore,
instead of remanding, simply awarded to the plaintiff the undisputed cost of
widening the road, rather than the diminution in value of the property without
the wider road. It noted, however, that
had there been evidence in the case that the narrower road would suffice for plaintiff's
needs, and that the fifty-foot requirement "was largely but not entirely
vestigial to the benefit of plaintiff's bargain,"
then the court might have accepted the jury's conclusion of
zero damages.
Comment: The editor is a bit puzzled by the damages
conclusion. One would think that it was
the burden of plaintiff to prove damages, including proving that the loss of
the wider road actually damaged it to the extent of the cost of widening,
instead of some lesser amount. Instead
of leaving the burden with the plaintiff, the court concluded that the
plaintiff had only to show that the contract provided for fifty feet, and then
the defendant had the burden of showing that the narrower road in fact did not
lead to damages in the amount of the cost of widening. Curious.
EASEMENTS; SCOPE; RELOCATION; EASEMENTS BY NECESSITY:
Servient tenant under easement by necessity has right to relocate utility
easement at its own expense when roadway in which utility easement existed is
abandoned, and the servient tenement is render significantly less valuable as a
consequence of the original location..
Huggins v. Wright, 774 So. 2d 408 (Miss. 2000)
In an opinion uncharacteristic of this court, which
generally is very thorough as to the relevant facts and has been known to fill
in a lot of irrelevant facts to make a good story, the court here tells us very
little about the underlying facts so
little that it is hard to understand fully the holding.
Two tracts were sold successively by a common grantor. Huggins got one tract, and Wright got the
other two months later. At the time of
severance, there was an old road that had been used traditionally to obtain
access to Huggins tract. This roadway
divided the Wright property in half. It is not clear whether this roadway was
used or was intended to be used in the future for access to Huggins'
property. If it was, then an easement
by implication would arise for access, and not an easement by necessity.
A dispute arose between the parties as to the location of
electric and water utilities serving Huggins' property. Wright did not want these utilities running
across the center of Wright's property.
Here is where the greatest ambiguity arises. The court does not tell us whether the road was still in use and
also does not tell us whether there were existing utilities in the roadbed. But
it does speak consistently about the "relocation" of the utility
easement, which would suggest that there had already been some acquiescence in
the notion that an easement by necessity existed and some utilities had already
been placed in the roadbed. The
presence of the utilities in this roadbed would not appear to be a significant
difficulty for Wright if the road was still in use, and the court appears to
concur in Wright's claim that the presence of utilities at that location caused
an inconvenience for Wright. This
suggests that the roadway had been abandoned.
The case is significant because of its apparent holding that
the utilities could be relocated at the behest of the servient owner. Although the servient owner has the right first
to declare the location of an easement by necessity, and the dominant tenant
must accept such location as reasonable, many decisions appear to assume that
this location is permanent. Here, the
Mississippi court, citing 1989 precedent, concludes that an easement by
necessity, at least, can be relocated by the servient owner, at its expense, if
the location proves to be a significant problem at some future time.
The case further holds, over the servient owner’s objection,
that the servient owner has the burden to pay for the relocation. This would not be surprising if the utilities
in fact were in place. But, as indicated, the opinion is somewhat vague on that
point. If, in fact, the
"relocation" was just a change from one hypothesized location to
another, and the dominant tenant had expended no funds to locate the easement
originally, then it would seem appropriate for the dominant tenant to be
responsible for the cost of constructing and maintaining the easement.
Comment: The
Restatement of Servitudes posits that courts should always have the equitable
power to relocate easements. This case
appears to be consistent with that position, at least as to easements by
necessity. This rule is somewhat of a
departure from the existing law in many jurisdictions, where courts would hold
that an easement, once created, inheres in a specific location and cannot be
relocated without the dominant tenant's consent (which was lacking here.) Is
the Restatement position a good idea?
The editor is still mulling the situation. The editor is of the view that generally speaking the market will
resolve these issues if the law is clear if we don't give both sides a fighting
chance for a court to exercise or withhold discretion as to whether the
easement will be honored as originally created. But, even with very clear rules, there may be some circumstances
in which equity would justify a relocation, paid for by the person requesting
it. Still mulling . . . .
EASEMENTS; SCOPE; RELOCATION; EASEMENTS BY NECESSITY:
Servient tenant under easement by necessity has right to relocate utility
easement at its own expense when roadway in which utility easement existed is
abandoned, and the servient tenement is render significantly less valuable as a
consequence of the original location..
Huggins v. Wright, 774 So. 2d 408 (Miss. 2000)
In an opinion uncharacteristic of this court, which
generally is very thorough as to the relevant facts and has been known to fill
in a lot of irrelevant facts to make a good story, the court here tells us very
little about the underlying facts so
little that it is hard to understand fully the holding.
Two tracts were sold successively by a common grantor. Huggins got one tract, and Wright got the
other two months later. At the time of
severance, there was an old road that had been used traditionally to obtain
access to Huggins tract. This roadway
divided the Wright property in half. It is not clear whether this roadway was
used or was intended to be used in the future for access to Huggins' property. If it was, then an easement by implication
would have arisen for access, and not an easement by necessity.
A dispute arose between the parties as to the location of
electric and water utilities serving Huggins' property. Wright did not want these utilities running
across the center of Wright's property.
Here is where the greatest ambiguity arises. The court does not tell us whether the road was still in use and
also does not tell us whether there were existing utilities in the
roadbed. But it does speak consistently
about the "relocation" of the utility easement, which would suggest
that there had already been some acquiescence in the notion that an easement by
necessity existed and some utilities had already been placed in the
roadbed. The presence of the utilities
in this roadbed would not appear to be a significant difficulty for Wright if
the road was still in use, and the court appears to concur in Wright's claim
that the presence of utilities at that location caused an inconvenience for
Wright. This suggests that the roadway
had been abandoned.
The case is significant because of its apparent holding that
the utilities could be relocated at the behest of the servient owner. Although the servient owner has the right
first to declare the location of an
easement by necessity, and the dominant tenant must accept such location as
reasonable, many decisions appear to assume that this location is
permanent. Here, the Mississippi court,
citing 1989 precedent, concludes that an easement by necessity, at least, can
be relocated by the servient owner, at its expense, if the location proves to
be a significant problem at some future time.
The case further holds, over the servient owner's objection, that the servient owner
has the burden to pay for the relocation.
This would not be surprising if the utilities in fact were in
place. But, as indicated, the opinion
is somewhat vague on that point. If, in
fact, the "relocation" was just a change from one hypothesized
location to another, and the dominant tenant had expended no funds to locate
the easement originally, then it would seem appropriate for the dominant tenant
to be responsible for the cost of constructing and maintaining the easement.
Comment 1: The editor first wishes to call attention to one
rule apparently assumed by the Mississippi court here - that an easement of
necessity can arise for utility lines at all.
This rule is recognized in other cases, but is not uniform. Some courts limit the easement by necessity
to simple ingress and egress. The
editor likes the broader rule followed here.
Comment 2: The Restatement of Servitudes posits that courts should always have the equitable power to relocate easements. This case appears to be consistent with that position, at least as to easements by necessity. This rule is somewhat of a departure from the existing law in many jurisdictions, where courts would hold that an easement, once created, inheres in a specific location and cannot be relocated without the dominant tenant's consent (which was lacking here.) Is the Restatement position a good idea? The editor is still mulling the situation. The editor is of the view that generally speaking the market will resolve these issues if the law is clear if we don't give both sides a fighting chance for a court to exercise or withhold discretion as to whether the easement will be honored as originally created. But, even with very clear rules, there may be some circumstances in which equity would justify a relocation, paid for by the person requesting it. Still mulling . . .
Readers are urged to respond, comment, and
argue with the daily development or the editor's comments about it.
Items in the Daily Development section
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