>Daily Development for Tuesday, July 8, 2008
>by: Patrick A. Randolph, Jr.
>Elmer F. Pierson Professor of Law
>UMKC School of Law
>Of Counsel:
Husch Blackwell Sanders
>Kansas City,
Missouri
>dirt@umkc.edu
>
>DEEDS;
INTERPRETATION; SERVITUDES: Restrictive covenants listed on an undated and
unsigned attachment to a deed that does not show on its face any encumbrances to
the property can be enforced as an equitable servitude against a remote grantee
if (1) the restrictions touch and concern the land, (2) the original parties
intended them to run with the land (particularly if the covenant expressly
states that intent), and (3) the remote grantee has actual notice of the
restrictions. In such a situation, equity does not require a common plan
of development if the grantor is the party seeking enforcement and if the remote
grantee took title with actual notice.
>
> Gambrell v.
Nivens, 2008 WL 539310, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tenn. Ct. Appl. 2008).
>
>The Gambrells
purchased 69 acres in Fayette County in 1991 and subdivided the parcel into four
lots, selling three and retaining one 20-acre lot. In the deed for two of
the lots (one of which was sold to Foshee), the Gambrells did not include any
encumbrances in the applicable section of the deed. However, they did
attach to the deed an untitled, undated, and unsigned page which listed several
restrictions, and this page was recorded with the deed. Apparently
recognizing their error, the Gambrells expressly incorporated the attachment
into the third deed.
>
>Foshee
subsequently conveyed his lot to the Nivenses in 1996. The warranty
deed evidencing that conveyance affirmatively represented that there were no
encumbrances on the property. However, when Foshee put the lot on the
market, he provided his real estate agent with a copy of the restrictions, and
the agent later provided the copy to the Nivenses’ agent, giving the Nivenses
actual notice of the restrictions.
>
>After acquiring
the lot, the Nivenses began construction of a large wedding chapel and facility,
which was in violation of the restrictions prohibiting commercial uses.
The Gambrells filed suit seeking injunctive relief and damages, arguing that the
restrictions precluded the Nivenses from constructing the wedding
facility. In response, the Nivenses contended that their lot was
unencumbered, the restrictions did not run with the land, and they had no notice
of the restrictions when they took title to the property.
>
>At trial, the
court held in favor of the Gambrells, granting a permanent injunction against
the Nivenses. The trial court reasoned that (1) the Nivenses had actual
notice of the restrictions prior to the transfer of title, and (2) the
attachment at least constituted a cloud on the title. On appeal, the court
addressed three primary issues:
>
>On appeal, the
Nivenses argued first that under Patterson v. Cook, 655 S.W.2d 955 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1983), a plaintiff/grantor is estopped by the equitable doctrine of
estoppel by deed from enforcing restrictive covenants that contravene the deed’s
apparent recital that the property is unencumbered. The court agreed
that unsigned paper that the Gambrells had attached to the Foshee deed was not
part of that deed, and that the warranty deed showed no encumbrances.
Thus, to that extent it could be argued that the Gambrells were attempting to
negate the quality of the title passed by their deed, which is grounds for
invocation of the doctrine of estoppel by deed. The court, however,
distinguished Patterson from the current situation on a variety of technical
grounds, but most importantly because, unlike the party to be bound in
Patterson, the Nivenses had actual notice of the restrictions in this case and
accordingly, did not detrimentally rely on any express or implied
represent
ation that the property was unencumbered. Of course, estoppel by deed, like any estoppel, is an equitable doctrine, and Nivens had full awareness that the Gambrells and Foshee, Nivens’ predecessor, regarded the property as encumbered and also the nature of those encumbrances.
>
>Nivenses next
argued that the restrictions could not be enforced as an equitable servitude
because there was no common plan of development and the Gambrells did not
similarly restrict their retained lot, as evidenced by the Gambrells growing
their grass too long and Mr. Gambrell “strategically discharging his shotgun”
during a wedding ceremony at the “wedding chapel” site. The court
concluded simply that, although common plan analysis often was useful in the
recognition of an equitable servitude, it was not a necessary element of the
concept in every case.
>
>To establish
an equitable servitude in Tennessee, three basic requirements exist:, (1) a
restriction must touch and concern the land, (2) the original parties to the
restriction must have intended that it run with the land, and (3) the remote
grantee must have had notice of the restriction. All of those factors were
abundantly clear here. The court held that each of these elements was satisfied
in this situation. The existence of a common plan might be useful to identify
those persons whom the originally parties intended to benefit. Or it might
be useful to demonstrate that a parcel was burdened by a set of restrictions by
implication even though no express promise was made by a grantee of that parcel
to be bound. But Tennessee courts have not established the existence of a
common plan as a condition to recognition of an equitable servitude in every
case.
>
> First, the “touch
and concern” requirement was satisfied by the building restrictions here.
The court did note that the case did not clearly raise the question of whether
an “covenant in gross” - with no benefitted parcel, would run with the
land. Although it was not clear that the parties intended that Gambrells’
successors could enforce the covenant, there was no question that Gambrells’
land was benefitted by promise in the requisite way.
>
>With respect to
the second element, the record revealed that Foshee firmly believed that
the terms of his contract included the restrictions (which he understood would
run with the land for thirty years) despite the fact that this intent was
embodied in undated and unsigned writings located below the signatures that did
not constitute “part of the deed.” While the written covenants failed in
form, “the original covenanting parties confirmed their substance,” and the firm
language in the attachment clearly indicated Gambrell’s intent that the
covenants run with the land. Finally, the record established that the
Gambrells had notice of the restriction.
>
>Nivenses finally
argued that when Foshees gave a warranty deed that stated on its face that there
were no encumbrances, they released the covenants. The court quickly
disposed of the last issue. All beneficiaries of the restrictions (most
notably the shotgun toting Gambrells) must agree to a release in order for it to
be effective.
>
>Comment: An
interesting further inquiry might be what liability Foshee might have on the
warranty deed that denied the existence of covenants. Remember that
simultaneously with delivery of the deed Foshee delivered a statement of the
covenants and had informed the Nivenses of their existence. Although some
might argue that some technical argument such as merger by deed or a Statute of
Frauds bar might be used, a court, operating in equity, can and often will make
happen what the parties clearly intended to happen, nothwithstanding the absence
of technical niceties.
>
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