Daily Development for
Tuesday, March 6, 2000
By: Patrick A. Randolph,
Jr.
Professor of Law
UMKC School of Law
Of Counsel: Blackwell Sanders Peper Martin
Kansas City, Missouri
randolphp@umkc.edu
ZONING AND LAND USE; USE
RESTRICTIONS; SIGNS: An ordinance governing exterior signs covers interior
signs that are designed to be visible from the exterior.
State v. Schad, 160 N.J.
156, 733 A.2d 1159 (1999).
This appeal considered
whether the restrictive provisions of a municipal ordinance applied to signs
that were not physically located outside or affixed to the exterior of a
commercial property and, if so, whether the ordinance unconstitutionally
restricted commercial speech. Without securing a permit, the owner of two adult
entertainment establishments erected eight displays at one of the locations and
twelve at the other. Each display consisted of a backlit color transparency
measuring about fortythree square feet, depicting a woman dressed in swimwear. The
displays were placed twelve to twentyfour inches behind the windows, but were
not attached directly to the windows. They were visible only from the outside
of the buildings and were illuminated at night. The displays caused the owner
to be issued summonses for various violations of the municipality's sign
ordinance, including exceeding the maximum number permitted and the maximum
gross square footage allowed at a given location, and failure to obtain permits
for the transparency displays.
The municipal court and
the Law Division each held that the business owner violated the municipality's
ordinance.
The Appellate Division
reversed all of the convictions and vacated all of the fines, holding that the
transparency displays placed inside the windows were not "signs"
within the meaning of the municipality's sign ordinance. Given its holding, the
Appellate Division did not reach the constitutional issues raised by the
property owner.
The New Jersey Supreme
Court ruled otherwise. To it, the language of the municipality's sign ordinance
applied to interior illuminated transparency displays that were intended to be
visible from outside the premises. In addition, it held that the ordinance did
not unconstitutionally limit the business owner's speech. It reinstated over $95,000
in fines that had been levied against the business, finding that these fines
did not constitute "cruel and unusual punishment."
The ordinance in question
defined a sign as "[a] structure and a land use, a building wall or other
outdoor surface or any device used for visual communication, display,
identification or publicity... ." Another section of the ordinance
elaborated by saying, "[a] sign shall include banners, streamers, whirling
or lighting devices or any other type of attention attracting device and may be
a singlefaced, doublefaced or a Vtype structure." It also described
several types of signs. For example, "(1) Business sign. A sign which
directs attention to a business or commodity for sale, or a profession, service
or entertainment rendered or offered upon the premises where such sign is
located," and "(7) Illuminated Sign. Any sign which is designed to be
seen at night by virtue of artificial light from within, behind or upon such
sign, but not including reflectortype signs unless the source of light is made
a part of, or is related to, such sign," and "(9) Wall sign. A sign
attached to or painted on a wall and subject to all sign regulations
herein." The ordinance continued by requiring a permit for nonresidential
signs exceeding twelve square feet and any illuminated sign, regardless of
size. The number of signs and the maximum total area of all permitted signs were
limited. The ordinance made reference to temporary window signs which were not
to be considered in computing the allowable sign area, "provided that such
interior window signs do not cover more than ten percent (10%) of any single
window and are not permanently affixed to the window."
The Court pointed out that
the rules for interpretation of a municipal ordinance require that the
ordinance be interpreted to "effectuate the legislative intent in light of
the language used and the objects sought to be achieved." If the meaning
derived from the language of the ordinance is susceptible to different
interpretations, a court is required to consider extrinsic factors, such as the
statute's purpose, legislative history, and statutory context to ascertain the
legislature's intent. Thus, for example, where a statute or ordinance does not
expressly address a specific situation, a court will interpret it
"consonant with the probable intent of the draftsman 'had he anticipated
the matter at hand'." Further, zoning ordinances generally are liberally
construed in favor of a municipality.
The Court found the plain
language of the ordinance to be unambiguous and indicated that the drafters
intended to include interior signs designed to be viewed from the outside of
the premises. It pointed to the broad catchall definition of "sign"
as "any device used for visual communication... ." In doing so, it
gave broad coverage to the term "any." It suggested that the
formulation "used for" suggested that the identification of a device
as a "sign" depends on its purpose.
The Court clearly
considered the business owner's transparencies as devices used for visual
communication, display, identification, and publicity. They had the obvious
purpose of communicating a message and generating publicity by identifying and
depicting the type of entertainment provided at the premises. The Court
rejected the Appellate Division's conclusion to the contrary and stated that
such a conclusion would allow a display attached to the external face of a
window to qualify as a sign while excluding the exact same display mounted on
the internal side of the window.
As to the qualifying term
"outside" as found in the ordinance, the Court believed the term
could be invested with a meaning that served the purpose and effectuated the
basic intent of the ordinance by applying to all signs the requirement that the
display be observable from outside the building by the public. There was no
need to limit its definition to signs that were physically located outside a
building. Consequently, the Court concluded that the language of the ordinance
defining signs that are subject to its regulatory standards and restrictions
included and applied to interior illuminated transparency displays that are
intended to be visible from outside of the premises.
As to the constitutional
argument, the Court held that the ordinance clearly involved commercial speech
and that the ordinance was content neutral in its application to commercial
communications. The Court further held that the ordinance did not restrict
speech based on its content and that its regulatory restrictions examined under
standards of intermediate scrutiny applicable to commercial speech were not an unconstitutional
limitation of the business owner's speech.
Comment: The court was
faced with a city that insisted on enforcing its ordinance in this case, and an
ordinance that arguably permitted the City to do so, even though the ordinance
clearly was written to cover outdoor signs, including those pasted on windows,
and probably wasn't addressed to indoor displays. It would appear that the
$95,000 in fines suggests that there was a little animosity in this case in the
City's enforcement endeavor. Of course, everybody knows that adult businesses
are the classic "bad guys," deserving no break and no pity, except,
of course, when we represent them or when they represent our freedom of speech.
But what does this case say about windows in commercial establishments generally?
It would seem clear that any shop window falls within the ordinance, as all of
them are intended to be viewed from outside. What about car dealerships? Don't
they position the cars inside their display rooms so that passersby can view
them?
Is it really appropriate
to conclude that a sign ordinance that focuses primarily on outside signs ought
to do "double duty" and regulate indoor displays as well? Maybe it's
within the prosecutorial discretion of a city to so interpret its ordinance,
but the editor is concerned that the city may not be quite so anxious to go
after Macy's Christmas windows or the Corvette display at the Chevy dealer. At
some point, equal protection comes into play.
Readers are urged to respond, comment, and argue with the daily
development or the editor's comments about it.
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