Daily Development for Wednesday, September 3, 2008
by:
Patrick A. Randolph, Jr.
Elmer F. Pierson Professor of Law
UMKC School of
Law
Of Counsel: Husch Blackwell Sanders
Kansas City,
Missouri
dirt@umkc.edu
Here are two recent cases dealing with
alternatives to “diminution in value” measurements of damages in the case of
nuisance. Threats of the possibility of restoration damages often are
quite useful in settlement, and these two cases that make such threats credible
or better. Ed.
NUISANCE; TRESPASS; DAMAGES:
Neighbors who had landowner's trees cut to improve their ocean view are liable
for cost of restoration, and not just for diminution in value, trebled under
trespass statute. Glavin v. Eckman, 881 N.E.2d 820, (Mass. App
.Ct. 2007).
Eckmans owned a parcel of land on Martha's Vineyard close to
the land of Glavin. Glavin owned two parcels to the west of the Eckmans. The
closer of the two featured a knoll that previously contained a stand of ten oak
trees providing shade to wetlands that Glavin planned to convert into a pond. In
1996, Eckmans asked Glavin for permission to trim or cut down the trees to
improve their view of the ocean, which Glavin denied. In 2001, Eckmans hired Jon
Fragosa and his landscaping company ("Fragosa") to top and remove various trees
on their property to improve their water view. Eckmans and Fragosa did not walk
the boundaries of their land, but Fragosa was instructed to open the ocean view
"to the max."
While cutting down trees, Fragosa crossed fifty to one
hundred feet across the boundary line onto Glavin's land and cut down all ten
oak trees, which measured from eleven to thirty inches in diameter. It was
readily apparent that the oaks were not on the Eckmans' property.
Neither
Eckmans nor Fragosa contend that they had good reason to believe that the oaks
were on the Eckmans' property. Massachusetts statues prohibit the willful
cutting down or destruction of trees on the property of another, and a person
who does so with no good reason to believe the trees were on their own property
is liable for treble damages. At trial, the Eckmans were held liable for the
destruction of the trees because they had instructed Fragosa to maximize their
view and "retained ultimate control over the scope of Fragosa's work.
The
jury rendered a special verdict on favor of Glavin and ordered damages of
$30,000 as reasonable cost of restoration of the trees. Additionally, because
the Eckmans and Fragosa had no good reason to believe the trees were on the
Eckmans' property, treble damages were assessed.
The defendants argued on
appeal that the trial court had erred it permitted the jury to measure damages
as cost of restoration rather than as timber value or diminution of market value
of the property.
The appellate court held that generally, a plaintiff may
opt for either the value of the timber cut or the diminution in value of his
property as the measure of damages. But, where the diminution in value does not
fairly represent the damages, the plaintiff may opt for restoration costs for
damages.
At trial, Glavin showed that he planned to create a pond from
his wetlands, and that the oak trees would provide both shade for the pond as
well as a backdrop to the view of the pond from his house, two losses that
cannot be adequately measured by diminution in value. Replacing such old oak
trees would be nearly impossible, so Glavin put forth expert arborists who
testified about determining the cost-of-cure of the destruction of the oaks.
These experts determined that replacement costs would be more than $55,000. The
appellate court held that in light of the circumstances and the expert
testimony, the $30,000 in damages awarded by the jury was not unreasonable, and
that the General Laws mandated treble damages while showcasing a legislative
intent to dissuade wrongdoers.
Comment: Was it really the
intent of the legislature to triple the damages even when they were restoration
damages? Typically the cost of restoration is invoked when it is higher,
and such damages measures are not available, as this case shows, without special
justification. The owner just got a windfall when, in addition to the
special justification, it got triple damages based upon restoration costs.
The outcome here strikes the editor as excessive.
NUISANCE;
DAMAGES: Where trust beneficiary's house was held for personal use, had
been her family's home for almost 80 years, and damage to the house was
permanent, the proper measure of damages against neighbor who caused the
structural damage was the cost of repair to the house as opposed to the
diminution of value attributable to the damage. LaSalle National Bank v Willis,
880 N.E.2d 1075 (Ill.App.1d., 2007).
Willis began work on his property,
acting as his own general contractor. As part of this work he had the
preexisting building torn down and built an expensive new residence for himself.
Willis knowingly failed to take proper protective measures during the
construction process to protect Witt's home, located next door, and as a result
Witt's home suffered structural damage making the home unsafe, forcing Witt to
move out and sell her home. LaSalle, Witt, and after her death, her estate,
(collectively, the "Plaintiff") filed suit against Witt on a number of claims.
As a motion in limine, Willis requested that the court bar all evidence of the
cost or repair damages. The court denied Willis's motion, holding that the
proper measure of damages was the cost of repair but certified the issue for
appeal.
The Appellate Court was asked to decide whether the proper
measure of damages was the difference between the market value of the property
before the injury and its value after the injury, or in the alternative, the
reasonable expense of repairs to restore the property to its original
condition.
The court found that the a fact based inquiry provides the
correct answer in any given case. First, relying on Arras v Columbia Quarry Co.,
367 N.E.2d 580 (Ill.App.2d., 1977), the court held that a court must look to the
nature of the thing injured to determine whether an injury to realty is
permanent or temporary, and in cases where the injury is not permanent, the
ordinary proper measure of damages is the cost of repair. Second, a
court must look at the exact interest harmed. When land is held for a personal
use such as a family residence and the harm may be corrected with a reasonable
expenditure even though the expenditure exceeds the amount the land has
diminished in value, again, the the cost of repairs is ordinarly the proper
measure of damages.
The court noted that if the proper measure of damages
in these cases was held to be the change in fair market value, such a holding
would effectively give owners a right of private eminent domain.
The
court also distinguished the present case from Ceres Terminals, Inc. v Chicago
City Bank & Trust Co., 635 M.E.2d 485 (Ill.App.3d., 1994) in which the
proper measure of damages was change in fair market value primarily on the basis
that the property in Ceres was commercial property and therefore the owner could
be made whole by an award of the diminution of fair market value. Here, where
the damage to the property was reparable and the property owner had an interest
in having the property restored to its original condition, the proper measure of
damages was the cost of repair plus the value of the loss of use of the building
during the time of repair.
Items reported here and in the ABA
publications
are for general information purposes only and
should not be
relied upon in the course of
representation or in the forming of decisions
in
legal matters. The same is true of all
commentary provided by
contributors to the DIRT
list. Accuracy of data and opinions
expressed
are the sole responsibility of the DIRT editor
and are in no
sense the publication of the ABA.
Parties posting messages to DIRT are
posting to a
source that is readily accessible by members of
the general
public, and should take that fact
into account in evaluating
confidentiality
issues.
ABOUT DIRT:
DIRT is an internet
discussion group for serious
real estate professionals. Message volume
varies,
but commonly runs 5 to 15 messages per work day.
Daily
Developments are posted every work day. To
subscribe, send the
message
subscribe Dirt [your
name]
to
listserv@listserv.umkc.edu
To cancel your
subscription, send the message
signoff DIRT to the
address:
listserv@listserv.umkc.edu
for information on other
commands, send the message
Help to the listserv address.
DIRT has an
alternate, more extensive coverage that includes not only
commercial and
general real estate matters but also focuses specifically upon
residential
real estate matters. Because real estate brokers generally find
this
service more valuable, it is named “BrokerDIRT.” But
residential
specialist attorneys, title insurers, lenders and others
interested in the
residential market will want to subscribe to this
alternative list. If you
subscribe to BrokerDIRT, it is not necessary
also to subscribe to DIRT, as
BrokerDIRT carries all DIRT traffic in addition
to the residential discussions.
To subscribe to BrokerDIRT, send the
message
subscribe BrokerDIRT [your
name]
to
listserv@listserv.umkc.edu
To cancel your
subscription to BrokerDIRT, send the message
signoff BrokerDIRT to the
address:
listserv@listserv.umkc.edu
DIRT is a service of the
American Bar Association
Section on Real Property, Probate & Trust Law
and
the University of Missouri, Kansas City, School
of Law. Daily
Developments are copyrighted by
Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., Professor of Law,
UMKC
School of Law, but Professor Randolph grants
permission for copying
or distribution of Daily
Developments for educational purposes,
including
professional continuing education, provided that
no charge is
imposed for such distribution and
that appropriate credit is given to
Professor
Randolph, DIRT, and its sponsors.
DIRT has a WebPage
at:
https://e2k.exchange.umkc.edu/exchweb/bin/redir.asp?URL=http://cctr.umkc.edu/dept/dirt/