Daily Development for Thursday, August 29, 2002
By: Patrick A.
Randolph, Jr.
Elmer F. Pierson Professor of Law
UMKC School of Law
Of Counsel: Blackwell Sanders Peper Martin
Kansas City, Missouri
prandolph@cctr.umkc.edu
Note that there are two items here about the same case,
dealing with quite distinct aspects.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; MUNICIPAL PROPERTY; VOLUNTEER FIRE
DEPARTMENT: A volunteer fire department is not a "public entity or quasi
public entity" and need not comply with laws restricting such entities in
leasing or disposing of its real property.
Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Borough of Upper Saddle River
Zoning Board of Adjustment, 352 N.J. Super 575, 801 A.2d 336 (App. Div. 2002).
A volunteer fire department in a residential section of a
municipality entered into a lease with cellular telephone carriers to allow a
tall monopole to be built on the fire company's property. That monopole would support antennas for the
cellular telephone companies as well as replace a shorter, less efficient
antenna used by the fire company. The
zoning board refused to grant the variances that would have been needed to
construct a monopole and to locate the associated communications equipment.
Then, the municipality adopted amendments to its zoning
ordinance "which repealed the permitted use of antennae and towers on
municipal property and their conditional use in commercial and industrial
zones."
The lower court held that the volunteer fire department
lacked authority to lease its property to the cellular telephone
companies. Essentially, the lower court
held that the volunteer fire department was "a public entity or at least a
quasi-public entity" and that it was required to confirm with the Local
Lands and Building Law, "when leasing any property... ." As a result,
the lower court found that the lease was void ab initio.
The Appellate Division disagreed, pointing out that even
though a volunteer fire department serves a public purpose and might enjoy the
support of public funds or property, it is not necessarily divested of its
private character. The Court pointed
out numerous New Jersey cases that validated the right of a volunteer fire
department to enter into contracts or leases, even with profit making
entities. It also rejected the line of
cases cited by the lower court to support the contrary proposition, pointing
out that those cases generally dealt with a volunteer fire company not having
the power of eminent domain. With
respect to the power of eminent domain, the Court pointed out that the power to
take private property must be expressly granted by statute and that volunteer
fire departments did not have that power.
As a result, the Court held that volunteer fire companies are authorized
to lease their property and that the proposed lease was authorized by statute,
consistent with case law, and not void ab initio.
Comment: This would seem to be a problem that a creative
public agency, focused on the issue, could easily avoid. It would seem possible for the agency to
acquire ownership of the facilities for the volunteer department and make them
available to the department, thereby establishing a "public property"
characteristic and otherwise achieving the goals of giving the volunteer
firefighters a place to keep their Dalmatians.
If this approach is unacceptable for some reason, then one wonders
whether that same reason might not explain why the fire station is in fact not
"public" in character.
ZONING AND LAND USE; PROCEDURE; REVIEW; REMAND: Where it is
clear to a court that a land use board is strongly opposed to granting a
variance and the record is complete, the court does not need to remand the
application for further hearings or a de novo review; it can decide the matter
on its own because to issue a remand would be futile. : Sprint Spectrum, L.P.
v. Borough of Upper Saddle River Zoning Board of Adjustment, 352 N.J. Super
575, 801 A.2d 336 (App. Div. 2002).
A volunteer fire department in a residential section of a
municipality entered into a lease with cellular telephone carriers to allow a
tall monopole to be built on the fire company's property. That monopole would support antennas for the
cellular telephone companies as well as replace a shorter, less efficient
antenna used by the fire company. The
municipality's zoning board took extensive testimony which, from the record,
would have appeared to provide great technical support for the cellular
telephone companies' argument that there was a significant gap in coverage
throughout much of the municipality.
Nonetheless, the board held that coverage was adequate and refused to
grant the variances that would have been needed to construct a monopole and to
locate the associated communications equipment.
Part of the appeal dealt with the power of the volunteer
fire department to lease the property, and this issue is discussed under the
heading "Municipal Corporations; Municipal Property; Volunteer Fire
Department." Another portion of
the appeal, however, dealt with the validity of the refusal to grant a
variance, which refusal, the parties to the lease argued, violated the
preemptive provisions of the Federal Telecommunications Act (TCA)] . Their argument "focused on the
preemptive effect of the [Federal Telecommunications Act when a local zoning
board's refusal to allow construction of a wireless communications facility
results in a significant gap in service."
In rejecting the cellular telephone companies' TCA claim,
the zoning board found "that [the proponents of the variance] had not
provided sufficient information to establish there is a gap in
service." The lower court agreed
with the board, "in this case, because here you're talking about an urban
area fully covered by the land lines."
The Appellate Division was not supportive of this
determination by the lower court nor was it supportive of the lower court's
dismissal of a vast amount of evidence presented to the board, by the telephone
companies, about a gap in service and the need for a taller antenna someplace
within the municipality. It pointed out
that the TCA "expressly preserves the judicial authority enjoyed by state
and local government to regulate land use and zoning, but places several
substantive and procedural limits upon the authority when it is exercised in
relation to personal wireless service facilities."
Specifically, the TCA limits the power of local zoning
authorities to make regulations that "unreasonably discriminate among
providers of functionally equivalent services" or "prohibit or have
the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services. ...
Basically, the TCA gives local authorities the first say in determining where
and how to construct [wireless communications facilities]; if, however, a local
authority's actions violate the provisions of the TCA, a court has the
authority to order the locality to take such steps as are necessary to grant
the relief which the wireless provider had originally requested from the
locality."
Although a court is required to be "deferential to the
opinion of the zoning authority and careful not to substitute its own judgment
for that of the local board, ... when deciding whether a zoning board's denial
of an application to construct a personal wireless communications facility has
the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services, the
court applies a de novo review that is not necessarily limited to the record
compiled by the local authority."
In this particular case, unfortunately, the lower court had
only canvassed the record before the zoning board to see if the board's
decision was supported by competent evidence.
Therefore, because it did not examine the evidence de novo, there were
no factual findings for the Appellate Division to review. On the other hand, when the Appellate
Division reviewed the record of testimony and submissions to the zoning board,
it did so de novo, and concluded that the companies had proven that the area to
be served was not already being served by another wireless communications
provider and that there was a "significant gap in the ability of remote
users to access the national telephone network."
It also concluded that it would fruitless and a waste of
time to require the cellular telephone companies to show that there were other
alternatives for locating a monopole in the requested position. According to the Court, such a requirement
"adds little to the analysis other than allowing local zoning boards to
opt for a facility location that is objectively more intrusive, but which may
be preferable for political or social reasons."
Essentially, the Court felt that the cellular telephone
companies had presented such overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence that the zoning board's conclusion
that the companies had "failed to prove the existence of a significant gap
in coverage within the [municipality] was erroneous as a matter of law."
It also refused to require the cellular telephone companies to face the "difficulty of proving a negative, especially in a competitive industry where even the most basic information is considered proprietary." In the Court's mind, the evidence before the board was "sufficient to establish that no other wireless service provider could" cover the area in question.
Lastly, it was quite clear to the Court that requiring the
companies to reappear before the board would "quite likely be
futile," because "it was clear that the Board was strongly opposed to
granting [their] application."
Finding the lower court's factual observations to be
"inexplicable," the Appellate Division mused that the lower court
"must have simply misunderstood the testimony before the Board." It then ordered that the variances be
approved because it was unwilling to remand the matter to a board that it had
shown its "reluctance to properly consider the evidence in the
record" in the first place.
Comment: Obviously another
big win for the telecommunications provider, and a scenario that is
being repeated continuously around the country. From what we know, it is difficult to discern whether the public
agency might have had other negotiating tools to moderate the impact of the
telecommunications tower or to relocate it to a better location. But it appears increasingly that when one
simply lies in front of the train of the Telecommunications Act, one gets
flattened. Readers are encouraged to comment upon and argue with the Daily
Development discussion.
Readers are urged to respond, comment, and
argue with the daily development or the editor's comments about it.
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