Daily Development for Monday, October 7, 2002

By: Patrick A. Randolph, Jr.
Elmer F. Pierson Professor of
Law
UMKC School
of Law
Of Counsel: Blackwell Sanders Peper Martin
Kansas City,
Missouri
prandolph@cctr.umkc.edu

The Reporter for today's case is Professor George Lefcoe of the University of Southern California. The editor, however, has changed everything around, so don't blame George if it doesn't make sense.

VENDOR/PURCHASER; CONDITIONS; FINANCING:  A financing contingency may extend a longer lifeline to a laggard buyer than the seller imagines.

Howard v. Youngman, 81S.W. 3d 101 (Mo.  App. 2002)

On July 7, 1998, Youngmans contracted to sell their home to Howard.

The form contract they used came from the St. Louis Association of Realtors. Closing was set for July 30, 1998. Like most form contracts, it had a loan commitment "drop dead" date by which the buyer had to obtain a suitable loan commitment or waive his rights under the financing contingency and proceed to closing without it. In the Youngman-Howard contract, the buyer had until 5 p.m. July 24, 1998, to obtain a loan commitment on terms specified in the contract. If Howard couldn't find a loan on exactly those terms, he had the option of waiving the contingency in writing or accepting a different loan, again notifying the sellers in writing by July 24.

As the appointed "drop dead" date went by with no word from Howard, the sellers and their brokers assumed the deal with Howard was off. On July 27, the Youngmans' broker told Howard's broker he was "out of contract".

The day before, sellers' broker had shown the house to a couple named Goings, and on July 28, the Goings signed a contract with the Youngmans    at a price $15,000 more than Howard was to have paid.

To make sure Howard had no lingering doubts where the Youngmans stood, on July 30th the Youngsmans' sent Howard a letter, drafted by their attorney, confirming their belief the deal with him was history.

That is exactly what the Youngmans did after they hadn't heard from their buyer by the date his loan contingency period expired.

Meanwhile, Howard had not been idle. Although the sellers didn't know it, Howard had managed to obtain a loan commitment and was ready to close. When the Youngmans didn't show up at the closing, he immediately sued them for specific performance. Predictably, he brought the sellers' broker into the fray by naming her as a defendant, claiming she had tortiously interfered with his purchase contract.

At trial, the Youngmans carried the day. But on appeal, the court reversed. Here was Howard's trump card: the form contract gave the buyer two days after acceptance to apply for a particularly described loan.

"If Buyer does not apply within that time for the loan, Buyer waives this financing contingency." Well, luckily for Howard he wasn't meticulously punctual in making his loan application. Instead of applying for a loan by July 9th two days after signing the contract  he waited until July 10th to make application. And he never applied for a loan as generous as the one described in the contract. He applied for less money and obtained the loan commitment he had sought by July 14, 1998.

For no reason apparent on the record, Howard never uttered a word about this loan commitment to anyone. Nor did he provide the written notice the contract contemplated when he accepted a commitment for a lesser sum than the one specified in the contract.

Despite leaving the sellers in the dark about his intentions, Howard prevailed in the appellate court. The trial court judgment in favor of the Youngmans and their broker was reversed and remanded. The appellate court decided that since Howard hadn't applied for a loan by July 9th, he had waived his loan contingency. Take a look at the language quoted two paragraphs earlier. That's exactly what it says. If the buyer hasn't applied for the requisite loan within two days, he waives his loan contingency.

Reporter's Comment 1:  Could the court have reached the opposite result? Easily. For one thing, the buyer never applied for the loan contemplated in the contract. For another, the court could have declared that an ambiguity existed in the two contract provisions concerning the loan contingency waiver. In the one relied upon by the court, the buyer had no obligation to notify the sellers. In the provision the sellers had thought pertinent, the buyer was obliged to provide the sellers with written notice. The court could have read the notice provision as controlling.

Reporter's Comment 2:   We have got to hope the St. Louis realtors are busy removing this ambiguity in their form by deleting the two day application contingency. Meanwhile, the Youngmans, their attorney and broker are paying for this unfortunate piece of drafting.

Sellers in this giddy market, take heed. If your first deal falters, don't enter a new contract with another buyer until you've got a signed release from the buyer you are cutting loose.

Editor's Comment 1: In commercial contracts, where an ambiguity as to a party's intentions exist, it is commonplace to send a letter indicating that some clarity is needed and that the party sending the letter intends to view the situation in a stated way and take action based upon that interpretation unless a clear response is provided.   It is not clear that such a tactic would be upheld as creating an estoppel in a case like this, involving a consumer purchaser, but it would have been worth a try.

Instead, Youngmans sent a "drop dead letter," and not an request for clarification.  They really didn't want to preserve the Howard contract, and appeared to be fully aware that Howard may still have had some rights.

Editor's Comment 2:   It is true that the contract created a difficult situation, but it did so for a reason - to put pressure on buyer to come up with the dough if buyer didn't invoke the financing contingency.    If that's the tactic the sellers (through their brokers) elected to use, the editor sheds no tears for them.  The editor believes that they got what they deserved.   Perhaps they should take up the problem with their broker.

 

Readers are urged to respond, comment, and argue with the daily development or the editor's comments about it.

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