Daily Development for Thursday, February 13, 2003
By: Patrick A. Randolph, Jr.
Elmer F. Pierson Professor of Law
UMKC School of Law
Of Counsel: Blackwell Sanders Peper Martin
Kansas City, Missouri
prandolph@cctr.umkc.edu
EMINENT DOMAIN; TAKING; INVERSE CONDEMNATION; URBAN RENEWAL
AREA: A city's designation of an area
surrounding plaintiff's bowling alley as an urban redevelopment study area,
together with certain statements from officials of the city stating that: (1)
the city would not wish a bowling alley in the area , (2) owner should forego
future investment in a new building, and (3) the city would likely acquire the
property in a couple of years, was not sufficient to constitute inverse
condemnation where the city did not physically invade the property, interfere
with ingress or egress, or commence condemnation proceedings.
Duwa, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 52 P.3d 213 (Ariz. App. 2002).
Duwa owned a bowling alley in
Tempe, Arizona. In the late 1980's and
early 1990's, the area around Duwa's bowling alley
began to deteriorate and experience an increase in crime. As a result, in 1996 Tempe designated the
area surrounding Duwa's property as an urban
redevelopment "study area."
Thereafter, Duwa asserted, the Mayor of Tempe and the head of
Tempe's Redevelopment Department indicated to representatives of Duwa that there would not be a place on the redevelopment
of Apache Boulevard for a bowling alley.
In addition, they indicated that Tempe would likely acquire Duwa's property in a couple of years and that Duwa should forego investment in a new bowling program
called "cosmic bowling" unless it could recoup its investment in a
couple of years. As a result, Duwa cancelled its plans for a renovation, informed bowling
leagues that it could not guaranty complete bowling seasons. Duwa lost a substantial
amount of business as a cause of this
and was unable to make its mortgage payments.
Duwa filed an inverse condemnation
complaint against the City of Tempe arguing that it suffered a "complete
taking of its property on or about December 31, 1998 when it was forced to
close its business operations." The
City of Tempe filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that there was no
valid claim for inverse condemnation because Tempe had not asserted any
physical control over Duwa's property.
The trial court granted the summary judgment as there was no
physical invasion of Duwa's property nor substantial interference with ingress or egress. Duwa, citing a
California case, noted that other courts have held that inverse condemnation
arose out of precondemnation announcements by a
public entity that reduced property values.
The trial court noted that there was no Arizona counterpart for the
California statute upon which the California court based its decision and
refused to extend that decision to Arizona.
Duwa appealed.
The Arizona Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's
decision, noting that Tempe did not physically invade the property or otherwise
interfere with ingress or egress. As to Duwa's argument that Tempe abused its condemnation powers
by "specifically and unreasonably targeting Duwa's
property" the court noted that in no other jurisdictions did the mere
manifestation of an intent to condemn, even if coupled with specific
representations regarding timing, constitute a de facto taking there must be
some overt act by the government authority.
The court particularly noted that if announcement of consideration of an
impending condemnation constituted a de facto taking, it could hinder a
condemning authority's ability to plan for condemnation and publicize its plans
to the community.
The plaintiffs argued that the Arizona Constitution protected
citizens not only from uncompensated public "takings' but also from
uncompensated public "damage" to the property. The court acknowledged that a case might be
made that the value of the plaintiffs' property was reduced as a consequence of
the public actions, but indicated that the case law was clear that not all
reductions in value are Constitutionally recognized
"damage."
Comment 1: At least as the court gives us the plaintiff's
position, it seems to be overreaching, since a significant element of the
alleged damages arose when plaintiffs, responding to the private statements of
city officials, told their regular bowling league customers that they couldn't
guarantee a complete "league season," thus driving those customers to
other bowling alleys. This judgment
error cannot be laid to the feet of the City in any event, as no one at the
City instructed the alley to cease operations.
Comment 2: The more difficult case, of course, is made when
the City's public announcement that there will be a redevelopment in the area
in fact drives landowners to curtail development, leading to an overall decline
in land values during the often protracted redevelopment planning process. Often these projects linger for decades, and
then result in the City's abandoning its original grandiose scheme for a much
simpler one that does not involve much of the original area at all. There is no question that direct public
activities have reduced land values in a very predictable way.
If the city had deliberately depressed land values to pick
up the property more cheaply in condemnation, such as by downzoning
or denying zoning benefits, there is some authority that supports
recovery. But where
the depression in values is simply the outcome of the redevelopment process,
even though a predictable outcome, the Arizona court is correct that the
general trend in the courts is to deny inverse condemnation recovery. To permit recovery here would saddle
legitimate planning efforts with heavy costs that, it might be argued, are no more
than the type of costs that citizens always bear when a city engages in
planning activities.
Landowners aren't entitled to compensation every time cities
do things that cause decline in their property values - recovery is limited to
those situations in which landowners bear a significantly disproportionate
share of the cost of public development.
Sad as many of these "redevelopment area depression" cases
are, courts tend to view the injuries as the inevitable (and non-compensable) cost of living in an organized society.