Daily Development for Monday, February 17. 2003

 

By: Patrick A. Randolph, Jr.
Elmer F. Pierson Professor of Law
UMKC School of Law
Of Counsel: Blackwell Sanders Peper Martin
Kansas City, Missouri
prandolph@cctr.umkc.edu

 

Note that we have two items relating to the same case here:

 

SERVITUDES; ENFORCEMENT; INJUNCTION: "Irreparable Harm" standard need not be satisfied to enforce land use covenant.

 

Chestnut Real Estate Partnership v.  Huber, 811 A. 2d 389 (Md. 2002)

 

This dispute arises out of the ashes of an earlier dispute, which apparently had been resolved in a form of "contract zoning." Developers had been permitted to develop the subject property as part of a "continuing care" facility but had executed a covenant, enforceable by neighboring landowners, controlling the size and rate of expansion of the care facility.  The relevant portion of that covenant stated, as to the subject parcel, that the parcel:

 

". . . shall remain as open space and shall be used solely for recreation, golf holes, non lighted tennis courts or similar recreational activities for the exclusive use of the residents of the community and their guests for a period of fifty years from the date of the Agreement.  The parties agree that [this parcel] shall not be subdivided ans shall be used only in conjunction with the use authorized for [the rest of the subject property] during that period.  It is further agreed that there will be no parking permitted, no buildings nor structures nor paving of any sort constructed . . . or permitted other than [as prior agreed].  The parties further agree that there shall be no lighting of any of the activities permitted on [this parcel]"

 

Pretty clear, huh?  Not to the developers, who proceeded to construct a "garden shed" on the property, arguing that this use was ancillary to the overall residential use of the community and therefore not prohibited by the restriction.  They lost that one of course. (Notice where the covenant says "no buildings or structures?")

 

Failing at that argument, the developers argued that the lower court should not have enjoined the and order removal of the shed because of the trial judge's failure to find "irreparable harm" would result to those protected by the covenant.  Although the Maryland Court of Appeals acknowledged that this is the general requirement for injunctive relief, it not ought to be the standard for land use restrictive covenants when the covenant has been wilfully violated:

 

"While the "irreparable harm" requirement is generally an indispensable prerequisite for injunctive relief, "when there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right, against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one, a mandatory injunction may be granted in the first instance."

 

The court further analogized to the remedy of specific enforcement of a contract, which is routinely granted where damages are inadequate, regardless of a showing of irreparable harm.   Finally, the court held, that where an act complained of is such that by its repetition or continuance it may become the foundation of a claim of adverse or presciptive rights, that alone could support the issuance of an injunction although no actual or substantive injury be shown.

 

The court went on to particularly designate land use covenants as exempt from the requirement for a showing of irreparable harm.  Quoting from a Florida case, it stated:

 

"It is the theory of the law that every piece of land has a peculiar value, infringement of which is not readily remedial by assessment of damages of law . . . And where the facts are clear and undisputed, the court by means of a mandatory injunction may compel the undoing of a thing already done in violation of such covenants."

 

Comment 1:   Note that the court stops short of saying that the court will not look for "irreparable harm" even when there has been an inadvertant and unknowing violation of a covenant.  Nevertheless, it emphasizes at several points that the defendant in a covenant situation is on constructive notice of such covenants.  (Here, there apparently was so much "fuss and feathers" that there could be no question that the building of the shed would be challenged."

 

Comment 2: In the editor's experience, even if courts do view the "irreparable injury" standard as relevant, they note that the damage to the neighboring property need not be tangible or measurable in money damages.  The covenants often are designed to create a certain atmosphere within the community, and if the challenged activity will have an impact on that, or will encourage others to duplicate the activity, and thus add to a collective impact, the community has an interest worth protecting.

 

Comment 3: There may still be some cases in which a court would have difficulty awarding an injunction.  For instance, in one California case, the covenant contained a prohibition against satellite dishes (at a time prior to the preemptive federal recognition of rights to maintain such installations - but also at a time when the dishes were ten feet across.)  A resident constructed a dish in his fenced back yard and landscaped in such a way that  it was invisible to from outside the property.  The judge refused to apply the architectural restrictions in the community against the dish on the basis that they were "unreasonable" in prohibiting all dishes at all times.

 

Subsequent California common law has rejected the notion that the "reasonableness" test can be applied in reviewing covenants, but in the editor's view this would have been a good case for a court to consider denying injunctive relief.

 

Comment 4: Unfortunately, one of the standards that often is applied is whether the violation of the covenant is "willful."  Often, if the landowner believes that the covenant in question is being unreasonably applied, the only practical course of action is to violate the covenant and then defend a suit for injunction.  To apply for declaratory relief in advance is unlikely to lead to a positive result.  But by waiting, the defendant in the injunction case has made an investment that could be lost while at the same time building a case for injunction by his very defiance of the rule.

 

SERVITUDES; ENFORCEMENT; INJUNCTION: Fact that land use covenant is incorporated into land use order does not necessarily lead to requirement that party seeking to enforce it must "exhaust administrative remedies" with public agency where intent of covenant was to confer a private right of enforcement.

 

Chestnut Real Estate Partnership v.  Huber, 811 A. 2d 389 (Md. 2002)