Daily Development for Wednesday, September 8,
Patrick A. Randolph, Jr.
Professor of Law
UMKC School of Law
Of Counsel: Blackwell Sanders Peper Martin
Kansas City, Missouri
BANKRUPTCY; ASSIGNMENTS OF RENTS; PERFECTION:
Fifth Circuit rejects earlier interpretations of Mississippi law and concludes
that an assignment of rents contained in a recorded mortgage is
"perfected" as a matter of state law for purposes of priority against
garnishors of the rents, *even as to rents accruing prior to any default by the
Millette v. E.B. Inc., 1999 WL 6422208 (5th
Although the opinion is byu the highly
respected Edith Jones, and editor concludes the opinion is not only wrong, but
seriously mixes the concepts of "perfection" and
"activation." This is not a bankruptcy case, but the confusion here
could spill over into subsequent Fifth Circuit bankruptcy decision.
The mortgagee here had a relatively standard
assignment of rents clause assigning rents "as additional security" to
the creditor, reserving in the debtor the right to collect the rents prior to
Before there was any default on the mortgage,
a judgment lienholder sought to garnish the rents The mortgagee intervened in
the garnishment action, arguing that it was perfected in its lien on the rents
and had priority to all accrued rents from the time of such recordation.
Prior district court cases in Mississippi had
held that the assignment of rents creates an "inchoate interest" that
must be activated by some action of the mortgagee before it has priority as
against other creditors. The court
distinguished these cases by holding that they were not based upon Mississippi
law and, in any event, stated the "old" approach to priority of rents
Under the new approach, according to the
court, a rents assignment "is effective as against the morgagor and,
subject to the operation of the recordin act, as against third parties, upon
execution and delivery." No activation of the rents interest is necessary.
The court cites Section 4.2(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Property Mortgages
(1997). It certainly means the Restatement (Third), which is the first and only
Restatement edition on mortgages, published in 1997.
The rationale for the result, according to
the court, is the perceived unfairness that would result when a mortgagee is
unable to activate a rents interest and thus suffers as against third party
"Under the prior approach, a mortaggee with a lien on
rents or an assignment of rents clause will nearly always lose a priority
battle with ajudgment creditor when the debtor has not defaulted on
its payments under a
mortgage. A judgment creditor can perfect its interest
at any time by properly serving a writ of garnishment, while
a mortgagee is prohibited from taking the requisite "additional
action" to perfect until the debtor has defaulted. The leads
to a bizarre result: A mortgagee, which has done all it could to
secure its interest in the rents, loses priority to a judgment creditor
who had constructive knowledge of the recordation of the mortgagee's
assignment of rents."
Comment 1: The case is wrong on the
interpretation, wrong on the policy, and wrong on the result. All of this likely
results from a laudable aim to get rid of old authority at the District Court
level that suggested that a mortgagee is not "perfected" until
activated, and thus is subject to the strongarm power of a trustee in
bankruptcy. This issue has been thoroughly discussed on these pages in the past
and by the editor in several law review articles. Clearly, from the standpoint
of bankruptcy law, and from the standpoint of perfected priorities in general,
recordation of the assignment of rents is enough. But that conclusion does not
lead to the further conclusion that the mortgagee has an "activated"
interest in rents from the moment of foreclosure, even where the mortgage
provides otherwise. Neither the facts of this case, nor the Restatement, nor
good policy, compel the latter conclusion.
Here the result should have been that the
rents collected prior to activation of the assignment by the mortgagee should
have belonged to the garnishor, but that the garnishment should not have created
any priority in the garnishor as to rents accruing thereafter.
Comment 2: The court justifies its contrary
result by arguing that mortgagees otherwise are left with no ability to protect
themselves against garnishment of rents by judgment creditors. This is
demonstrably untrue. A mortgagee actually can collect or control rents from the
outset of the mortgage relationship through a "lockbox" arrangement.
The "lockbox" would create a fund in which the mortgagee has an actual
security interest as of the moment the rents are paid, free of claims of junior
creditors. Mortgagees frequently are doing exactly this. Not all mortgagors will
agree to the arrangement, and the issue can be heavily negotiated. But
mortagagees are not without a solution to the problem posed by the court.
The mortgagee clearly opted not to use a
lockbox here. The mortgage provided expressly that the "Debtor can have the
right to collect and retain the rents as long as the mortgage is not in
default." The mortgage was not in default at the time of garnishment. If
the debtor could have used the money for a trip to Aculpulco, who couldn't a
legitimate judgmnent debtor garnish it?
Comment 3: The Restatement says nothing that
compels the result reached by the court. The Restatement differentiates between
the perfection of the rents interest as against third parties and the
"activation" of that interest. Although Section 4.2 (b) of the
Restatement indeed includes the language cited by the court and quoted above,
Section 4.2 (c ) states that the mortgage can provide that the mortgagee's
rights to collect and apply the rents shall be deferred until a given moment,
such as default, and in that event "delivery of a demand for the
rents" is necessary to activate the mortgagee's interest.
In this case, the mortgagor did not default,
so the condition for activation of the rents interest did not arise, prior to
the garnishment. After the garnishment, it is quite possible that the mortgage
had provisions creating an event of default when a third party creditor
established a lien on the security superior to that of the mortgagee, but at
that time the mortgagee still would have had to send a notice in order to
activate its claim under the Restatement. Probably it would also have had to
send a notice of default under the mortgage as well.
The court here characterizes Mississippi as a
"modified lien theory state," which usually means that where the
mortgage is silent, the mortgagee can reach the rents immediately upon default.
But the mortgage is not silent. It discusses the mortgagee's abilitity to reach
the rents. As the Restatement notes, when the mortgagee has such a reserved
right, it only makes sense that activation requires some affirmative act. See
Restatement Section 4.2 Comment c. At the very least, the court should require
such an affirmative act unless the mortgage clearly provides otherwise.
Comment 4: This case is now the subject of a
certification petition to the Mississippi Supreme Court. The author urges
Mississippi lawyers to seek clarification by the state court system. Creating an
enforceable priority interest in rents when the mortgage provides expressly that
the rents belong to the mortgagor prior to default is a bad idea it creates
confusion, will lengthen the bargaining process for sophisticated parties who
have some inkiling of what's going on here, and is unecessary in order to give
lenders what the really need post default protection.
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