Daily Development for Tuesday, October 19,
1999
By:
Patrick A. Randolph, Jr.
Professor of Law
UMKC School of Law
Of Counsel: Blackwell Sanders Peper Martin
Kansas City, Missouri
randolphp@umkc.edu
MORTGAGES; FUTURE ADVANCES: Additional
construction funds advanced by beneficiary to trustor pursuant to a separate agreement
were secured by the subject property under the original deed of trust and were
not unsecured "additional loans."
Harrington Properties, Inc. v. Peterson, 973
P.2d 1004 (Utah App. 1999)
A builder gave a purchase money mortgage
(deed of trust) to a seller to finance the acquisition of a building lot on
which the builder would construct a luxury home for resale. The purchase
payment was deferred nine months pursuant to a note secured by the mortgage.
This mortgage was subordinated to a construction loan from an institutional
lender entered into at closing on the lot. The purchase money mortgage provided,
among other things, that it secured:
"[T]he payment of such additional loans
or advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns,
when evidenced by a promissory note or notes reciting that they are secured by
this Deed of Trust;"
The mortgage contained a covenant against
waste that was rather specific as to construction on the property. The borrower
agreed:
"To
keep said property in good condition and repair; not to remove or demolish any
building thereon; to complete or restore promptly and in good and workmanlike
manner any building which may be constructed, damaged or destroyed thereon; to comply
with all laws, covenants and restrictions affecting said property; not to
commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit, suffer or permit any act upon
said property in violation of law; to do all other acts which from the
character or use of said property may be reasonably necessary, the specific
enumerations herein not excluding the general; and, if the loan secured hereby
or any part hereof is being obtained for the purpose of financing construction
of improvements on said property Trustor further agrees:
(a) To commence construction and to pursue
same with reasonable diligence to completion in accordance with plans and specifications
satisfactory to Beneficiary. (b) To allow Beneficiary to inspect said property
at all times during construction. ....
Note that the last two items apply only if
the loan is made for construction. The original purchase money loan, of course
was not made for construction.
The deed of trust further provided that if
"Trustor fails to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided,
then Beneficiary ... without obligation so to do and without notice to or
demand upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any obligation hereof,
may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as [Beneficiary] may
deem necessary to protect the security hereof .... [a]nd in exercising any such
powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion
it may deem necessary therefor..."
Subsequently, the builder went over budget
on the house, and was unable to complete it with funds available from the
institutional lender. When the time came for payment of the purchase money
note, the home was still unbuilt and unsold, and the developer could not pay
the note. The developer subsequently declared bankruptcy. Six months after the bankruptcy
filing the purchase money lender and the builder entered into an agreement that
the purchase money lender would advance up to an additional $75,000 to complete
construction, as it appeared unlikely that in its present state the house would
return enough to pay off the purchase money note.
The loan agreement providing for the $75,000
in advances did not indicate that advances pursuant to this agreement were to
be secured by the original mortgage.
The trial court held that the advances were
not secured by the deed of trust because they did not fit within the future
advances provisions in that the loan agreement providing for them did not refer
to the earlier deed of trust.
The Court of Appeals "end ran" the
trial court's conclusion because it found the construction funds advanced to
the trustor were advanced under the provision of the deed of trust allowing
beneficiary to make expenditures to protect its security interest. The court
stated that the trustor was obligated to repay all sums expended by the
beneficiary regardless of how such advances were memorialized. The construction
advances were necessary since without the advances by the beneficiary, construction
on the property would have stopped.
Critical to the court's conclusion was the
first sentence of the waste clause, above, by which the borrower agreed to
"complete . . . any building which may be constructed, damaged or destroyed
[on the property]."
Comment 1: The court has turned the covenant
against waste and the general covenant to protect security into a virtually
unlimited right on the part of the mortgagee to advance funds to complete
construction notwithstanding the very specific language of the deed of trust
restricting future advances. Despite the language of the waste covenant
requiring the borrower to complete construction of buildings constructed on the
property, the court still had to deal with the "protection of security"
clause. Although the clause vested absolute discretion in the mortgagee, one
would assume that Utah courts, which have applied "good faith and fair
dealing" concepts to real estate cases in the past, would restrict such language
to authorize expenditures truly designed to "protect security."
When otherwise the property would lack
sufficient value to pay off the mortgage, an advance to complete construction,
the editor proposes, ought to satisfy the test, at least in cases like this
one, where the parties clearly intended that the mortgagor construct a building
on the property that would enhance its value. Although one could argue that the
advance may or may not increase the value of the property beyond the value of
the property with a partly completed building,, the mortgagee ought to be entitled
to the benefit of the doubt. After all, the mortgagee, by making the advances,
is taking a risk that the property will not even return the amount of the
original value plus the advances, and thus is making a financial commitment to
its judgment that the advances are worth the money.
It should be pointed out that these advances
may in fact take the mortgage amount beyond the original face amount of the
secured note. They would not be covered by the typical future advance
agreement, but as efforts to protect security, they are valid advances anyway. Mortgagees
who take positions junior to loans for property on which construction is
occurring should be aware of this danger.
Comment 2: But where the economics of the
original mortgage agreement did not contemplate the construction of buildings,
it seems more of a stretch to permit the mortgagee to advance money to complete
unfinished construction following default and to add the cost to the mortgage
debt. Obviously, any construction project involves risk, and the mortgagee
should not be able to subject the mortgagor (and the mortgagor's other
creditors) to the gamble that additional funds will add value to the property
when construction was not part of the original scheme.
Comment 3: There has some uncertainty in the
cases over the extent to which advances to complete or advance construction
constitute advances to protect security that properly are added to the mortgage
debt. Of course, where the mortgage instrument addresses the issue, the task of
the court ought to be simply to discern that intent as it applies to the facts at
hand. But what about where the instruments are silent?
The Restatement of Mortgages, in Section
2.2, takes the position that "advances to protect security" may be
added to the mortgage lien with the original priority of the mortgage whether
or not the mortgage provides for them if the advances are "reasonably
necessary for the protection of the security . . . (1) to protect the value of
the mortgage real property and the improvements on it; or (2) to protect
against the assertion of liens having priority over the mortgage."
Of course, if the debtor stops construction,
leaving the property exposed to weather and vandalism, one assumes that this is
an act of waste, and the mortgagee ought to be able to respond by stepping in
and expending money to "button up" the property, and to preserve it
in its present state.
But this is a far cry from actually
continuing construction on the argument that later completion of construction
will only be more expensive. The debtor, presumably for economic reasons, has determined
it doesn't make sense to pour more money into the project. Should we view the
lender as accepting the risk of such a decision if the lender hasn't bargained
for more in the mortgage?
In the reporter's notes, the Restatement
cites to relatively scant authority dealing with advances to complete
construction. But the reporters indicate, in Comment a, that advances to cover
"costs of completion by the mortgagee of improvements which the mortgage
was obligated to make but failed to complete" do satisfy the test This
clarifies the reporter's intent in the main language of the section, even
though it violates the Strunck & White "which/that" rule, a rule
with which the editor also struggles from time to time.
Readers are urged to respond, comment,
and argue with the daily development or the editor's comments about it.
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