2002 ANNUAL MEETING
Eminent Domain’s Role in Redevelopment:
The Evolution of the Public Purpose Doctrine
Theodore C. Taub
Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Eminent Domain’s Role in the Process......................................................................................... 2
Blight and The Public Purpose Doctrine....................................................................................... 3
Selected Earlier Cases................................................................................................................ 5
More Recent Cases From Various Jurisdictions........................................................................... 9
A Recent Public ~ Private Land Assemblage Approach............................................................... 20
Eminent Domain’s Role in Redevelopment:
The Evolution of the Public Purpose Doctrine
Theodore C. Taub
Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP
If ever there was a moving target in practicing land use law, it certainly is the task of assembling, financing and permitting projects aimed at revitalizing and redeveloping communities or discrete portions thereof. Bringing “partnerships” between the public and private sectors to fruition, while having to negotiate against a backdrop of “government in the sunshine” and public records laws is a process unfamiliar to those having only dealt with strictly private deals. Moreover, the target takes on a different configuration every time. Whether it is a city hall and library combined with retail and commercial activities, a new sports stadium, or a casino, the projects are multi-layered and complex.
The state and local government land use specialist is a necessary player in bringing any of these projects to opening day. And, whether of modest proportion or one of very large dimension and impact, almost every redevelopment or revitalization project requires the expertise of a number of different professionals. Most projects begin with both identifying the property to be redeveloped and how to bring it under the control of the particular entity or entities that may be spearheading the effort, whether that be a city council, a county commission, a development authority, a sports authority, some other governmental entity, or the Developer. The base at the fulcrum of development is what land is to be utilized, who owns it, and how can it be made available in order to have it jointly developed by the public and private sectors.
Thus, whether a mixed use project in Pittsburgh for 2.7 million square feet of offices, apartments, retail shops, parking lots and entertainment venues at a sprawling former LTV industrial site (110 acres producing steel since Civil War times); a redevelopment designed to bring new life to Albuquerque in a twelve block district near historic Route 66, by bringing new multiplex movie theaters, restaurants, a combination of chain and unique retail, and residences; a project covering twenty acres of the “downtown” of the City of Temple Terrace, Florida (population 21,000, “bedrooming” the City of Tampa ) for the purpose of a new city hall, civic center, together with new retail and residential uses; assembling land for a beach redevelopment project in Clearwater, Florida; or baseball stadium projects, the starter issue is who controls the land and how to achieve control thereof through judicial means (assuming that a portion of the necessary land must be acquired through means other than arms-length negotiated sales between willing buyers and sellers).
Eminent Domain’s Role in the Process
The usual means of the public forcibly acquiring private property is through the use of eminent domain proceedings. The power of eminent domain is the right of the sovereign to take private property for public use by paying just compensation. The procedure by which the power is exercised is condemnation. The term “taking” is sometimes used as a substitute for condemnation. Without having canvassed the entire country, this author believes that every jurisdiction has a statutory scheme dealing with the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Moreover, many jurisdictions have coupled the use of condemnation by cities, counties and other state agencies or governmental authorities, with its use by a community redevelopment agency (CRA) for the purpose of facilitating redevelopment. Normally, enabling legislation empowers redevelopment agencies with the ability to condemn property for redevelopment under specific criteria and standards set forth in the legislation.
Prior to filing a condemnation action, a condemning authority is usually required to engage in good faith negotiations with the fee owner of the parcel to be acquired. Besides providing the owner with the appraisal(s) upon which the condemning authority based its offer of compensation, the condemnor must strictly adhere to the statutory requirements forming the necessary procedural predicate upon which the condemnor may proceed. There are similar requirements regarding condemnees with potential business damage claims such as lessees in a shopping center that is to be taken for public use.
Further, those engaged in pre-condemnation negotiations per se, must consider the fact that the condemning authority in most (if not all) jurisdictions is required to pay the condemnee’s reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, as well as those for experts such as appraisers, business damage consultants, land planners and accountants.
Blight and The Public Purpose Doctrine
The assertion of “public purpose” as the linchpin of condemning private property for public use has even spawned cartoons, while controversy regarding the subject is ongoing in the fourth estate as well as legal commentaries and cases throughout the country. In the eyes of many, property deemed “blighted” by condemning authorities for redevelopment projects, just isn’t!
Fundamental to the acquisition of private property for public use is understanding that the public purpose doctrine limits the exercise of the power of eminent domain. The concept that private property may be taken for a public purpose is embedded in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which provides, however, that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation being paid. During the early years of the operation of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, a broad interpretation prevailed: as long as the purpose was of general benefit to the public, that alone was a valid reason for taking private property. During the mid 1800s, however, courts began adopting stricter views of public purpose, and “actual use” by the public was the standard applied to the taking of private property. Then, in the Twentieth Century, the more narrow view of actual public use broadened again. In the landmark case, Berman v. Parker, and later Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the Court expressed this broader point of view. [Quotes and further discussions of Berman and Midkiff will be found in the appended briefs.]
In Berman, the
Inasmuch as many redevelopment projects are carried out within a designated community redevelopment area, and because most CRA legislation limits a CRA to acquiring “blighted” property, it is important to understand how courts throughout the country have dealt with a finding of “blight” in the context of a “quick take” order of taking hearing. In addition, the study of novel approaches to land assemblage becomes equally important. Because the definition of “blight” has evolved in CRA legislation in recent years and the courts have imposed a higher burden of proof on condemning authorities in establishing “blight,” land assemblage has become more difficult.
Notwithstanding the fact that both federal and state constitutions
authorize the taking of private property for public use when full compensation
is paid, they do not speak to the taking of private property for private use per se.
States and their political subdivisions must comply with the
requirements of the Fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution (applicable to the states through the Fourteenth amendment)
as well as similar public use provisions contained in state constitutions. For example,
Selected Earlier Cases
The following cases demonstrate that, depending on jurisdiction, comparing older cases with newer cases highlights the trip that some courts have taken from almost automatic deference to a governmental condemning authority’s finding of public purpose when reviewing redevelopment projects where eminent domain has been used, to strict scrutiny of whether the property sought to be condemned is blighted according to the applicable redevelopment legislation defining “blight,” thus justifying the taking under more sophisticated and creative variations on the definitions of public purpose.
State v. Miami Beach Redevelopment Agency
In 1980, the Florida Supreme Court stated that a determination of the Legislature that a project is for a public purpose “while not conclusive, is presumed valid and should be upheld unless it is arbitrary or unfounded unless it is so clearly erroneous as to be beyond the power of the legislature.”
In 1991, an
Crestwood Commons v. 66 Drive-In
The Missouri Court of Appeals held that a local legislative body’s determination that the property was blighted was not an arbitrary exercise of legislative power. The court further held that absent a finding that an arbitrary decision induced by fraud, collusion or bad faith had been made, it would be presumed that the taking was for a public purpose. The court also determined that economic under-utilization was a valid purpose for declaring property blighted.
Here, a housing redevelopment plan
that authorized acquisition of property for subsequent sale or lease to private
enterprise was struck down by the Florida Supreme Court. The housing authority proposed to condemn the
land and then allow a private enterprise to develop it. This was challenged on the basis that such a
use of the state’s power was an unconstitutional exercise of that power. According to the court, “incidental
benefits accruing to the public from the establishment of some private
enterprise is not sufficient to make the establishment of such
enterprise a public purpose.” The
It is inconceivable that any one would seriously contend that the acquisition of real estate for the declared purposes set forth in the proposed Redevelopment Plan is for a public use or purpose. No one has ever heard of any corporation, association or individual going into any of the above mentioned businesses [retail, office, wholesale, and restricted industry] except for profit or gain. If the municipalities can be vested with any such power or authority, they can take over the entire field of private enterprise without limit so long as they can find a blighted area containing sufficient real estate.
JFR Investment v. Delray Beach Community Development Agency
Other cases in
The Florida Supreme Court noted the distinction between “public purpose” and “primary public purpose,” because the Florida Constitution prohibited “counties from using their taxing power or pledging public funds to aid a private entity unless the project [fell] within. . .” a specific exception.
If the County has not exercised its taxing power or pledged its credit, the obligation must merely serve a public purpose. On the other hand, if the County has used either its taxing power or pledge of credit to support the issuance of the bonds, the purpose of the obligation must serve a paramount public purpose and any benefits to a private party must be incidental. 
v. City of
In 1997, the Florida Supreme Court reversed a trial court order denying the validation of a series of bond issues for the construction of a new stadium for the Tampa Bay Buccaneers. The stadium agreement between the team and local government provided that the team would receive the first two million dollars of revenues generated from non-team events. The trial court concluded that this provision transformed the deal into one which served a predominately private purpose and therefore refused to validate the bond issues. The trial court noted, however, that because the construction of a new stadium would serve a “paramount public purpose,” it would validate the bond issues if the agreement was modified to preclude revenues from non-team events going to the Buccaneers. The Supreme Court, relying on cases finding that the development of tourism and recreational facilities served a public purpose, reversed the trial court’s decision with instructions to enter an order validating the bonds. The court held that an incidental private benefit did not render a bond issue improper as long as the public purpose predominated. In addressing the trial court’s suggestion that it would approve the bond issue if the stadium deal were modified, the court stated that “once a trial court has found that a ‘paramount public purpose’ exists, the court cannot micromanage the armslength business negotiations of the parties by striking discrete portions of a complex arrangement which, as a whole, the court candidly finds to be substantially beneficial to the public.”
More Recent Cases From Various Jurisdictions
A community’s feelings of “what’s right” for the development of land for “public use” and outdated legal precedent don’t always coincide. These differences can spell trouble in getting through the process in a timely manner commensurate with hitting the bond market and other potential funding mechanisms at the optimum time. Projects get challenged from a variety of quarters, lawsuits occur, and when property and constitutional rights are being vigorously argued the process can produce unforeseen, and unacceptable, delays. The following set of cases have been digested to illustrate how some developers and municipalities have sought to push the envelope on acceptable definitions and new theories to support takings for development.
These approaches incorporate the well known but perhaps not well understood concept of blight as a basis for condemnation. They also go beyond blight to try out creative applications of statutory provisions including such issues as condemnation for related private business expansion, long term reliance on an initial finding of blight, what kind of areas can be designated as redevelopment areas, takings with the unstated intent of preserving a private use for the economic benefit to a community and who wins when a religious organization’s property is to be taken for new retail use.
Today’s courts are producing a variety of results as shown in the following cases. The developer’s attorney proceeds at his or her peril without a knowledge of the multitude of new directions appearing out of litigation over public purpose and blight.
SWIDA made two offers to purchase an adjacent 148-acre tract of land for one million dollars. The neighboring landowner rejected the first offer and felt it unnecessary to reject a second identical offer. SWIDA instituted statutory “quick take” condemnation proceedings. Over the landowner’s objections that the land was going to be put to private use and that SWIDA had refused to make a good faith effort to negotiate, the trial court ruled in favor of SWIDA. Relying on testimony asserting that additional parking would alleviate risks stemming from traffic congestion and further help to eliminate blight, the trial court entered an order of taking and vested title in SWIDA. SWIDA immediately transferred title to the speedway developer.
In affirming the appellate court’s reversal, the Illinois Supreme Court emphasized that public purpose and public use were distinct concepts. The court acknowledged that SWIDA could legitimately exercise its eminent domain powers to promote commercial development and transfer property to private parties; however, the court insisted that when land is taken, even if transferred to a private party, “ ‘the public must be to some extent entitled to use or enjoy the property, not as a mere favor or by permission of the owner, but by right.’ ” The court highlighted the fact that the speedway developer had the more expensive option of constructing a parking garage and that SWIDA’s taking would yield $13-14 million in additional speedway revenues. The court found that public purpose goals such as stimulating the economy or enhancing public safety “must not be allowed to overshadow the constitutional principles that lie at the heart of the [eminent domain] power.” The court concluded that the “initial, legitimate development of a public project does not justify condemnation for any and all related business expansions.”
Yacht Club, Inc. v. City of
The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed a trial court’s order requiring a city to reconvey property taken in an eminent domain proceeding. The property belonging to the appellant yacht club was taken as part of a waterfront redevelopment plan. Of the fifty acres to be taken by eminent domain, the ten acres of waterfront property, which included the yacht club property, was economically viable and in good repair, and the remaining forty acres were blighted. The trial court determined the city’s plan of development was speculative and that taking the yacht club’s property could not be deemed necessary. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, finding that redevelopment agencies had a duty to “make reasonable efforts to negotiate and consider the integration of the property that is not substandard into the overall redevelopment plan.” Properties that were not in “substandard” condition were not subject to a taking unless they were “essential to the redevelopment” plan. In this case, the city’s refusal to consider integration of the yacht club property was unreasonable and precluded a showing that the property was not essential to the plan. Consequently, requiring the city to return the property to the yacht club was justified.
Aposporos v. Urban Redevelopment Commission
Elizabeth Board of Education v. New Jersey Transit Corp.
New Jersey Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s dismissal of a school
board’s complaint seeking to condemn property owned by a state
corporation. The New Jersey Transit
Corporation (NJTC) owned the property.
Both the City of
Communities, Inc. v. Town of
In another decision from the Supreme Court of Connecticut, the court affirmed a trial court’s order enjoining a municipality from implementing a hastily drawn development plan. AvalonBay owned a parcel of land zoned light-industrial which allowed for development of affordable housing units. AvalonBay sought approval for the construction of an apartment community that included some affordable housing units. The town denied AvalonBay’s site plan, wetland and special use permits, and three weeks later imposed a residential construction moratorium. The town subsequently commissioned a “project plan” for an industrial park to be situated on lands that included the parcel owned by AvalonBay and moved to take the property by eminent domain. Avalonbay brought an action to enjoin the plan and the taking. Ruling for Avalonbay, the trial court concluded that “the town had proceeded in bad faith and that the project plan was a pretext in an effort to thwart affordable housing on the AvalonBay parcel.” The Connecticut Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the order enjoining the town from proceeding with the plan and found that the injunction rendered the issue of the taking of AvalonBay’s parcel moot since the town could not proceed. The court held that “a project plan – even one that conforms to the [statutory requirement] – may be enjoined if it was adopted, not for the purposes contemplated by [the statute], but in bad faith and in furtherance of a plainly improper motive. . .”
a redevelopment authority in
Beach-Courchesne v. City of Diamond Bar 
The Diamond Bar City Council adopted an ordinance approving a redevelopment project involving 1,300 acres of land. The Council made findings that the area suffered from physical and economic blight which required redevelopment. The duration of the redevelopment was estimated to take thirty years. Barbara Beach-Courchesne and other Diamond Bar citizens filed a complaint against the City and others challenging the validity of the redevelopment plan. She alleged, in part, that there was a lack of substantial evidence to support a finding of blight in the project area. The trial court entered a judgment for the City.
against the City, a California Court of Appeal reversed. The court stated that pursuant to
The City’s 1995 general plan identified redevelopment as a means of mitigating traffic and financing improvements; however, the plan itself did not identify any physical or economic blight in the City. In reviewing the City’s administrative record and findings, the court found that there was no substantial evidence to support the City’s finding of blight within the meaning of the statutory definition. Therefore, the redevelopment plan had to be invalidated.
stated that to invoke “the extraordinary powers of community redevelopment” it
is not sufficient to issue a report and to adopt an ordinance speaking in the
statutory language. The purpose of the
California Redevelopment Law (“CRL”) is to provide a means of remedying blight
where it exists. The CRL is not simply
“a vehicle for cash-strapped municipalities to finance community improvements.” If the showing made in the case were not
sufficient to rise to the level of blight, it is the rare locality in
99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency
In the Central District of California, the district court enjoined a city and redevelopment agency from initiating condemnation proceedings against the plaintiff’s leasehold. The city, prior to the plaintiff bringing suit, adopted “Resolutions of Necessity” authorizing the condemnation of the plaintiff’s leasehold. The sole purpose of the proposed condemnation was to eventually convey the property to Costco, Inc. in exchange for $1 and Costco’s assurance that it would not relocate its store to another community. The city rescinded its resolutions authorizing condemnation and argued that the plaintiff’s §1983 claim had been rendered moot because the threat of a taking no longer existed. The court noted that the voluntary cessation of condemnation proceedings was not sufficient to establish mootness and the city failed to meet its burden of showing that condemnation proceedings could not “ ‘reasonably be expected to recur.’ ” Moving to the question of whether the contemplated taking was constitutional, the court framed the issue as whether the city had presented a “valid or pretextual public use” for its condemnation plans. The court rejected the city’s argument that keeping Costco in the community was a valid public use in that it would prevent future blight. The court, acknowledging that the property in question used to be blighted, observed:
If a city cannot even obtain redevelopment powers in the first place unless there is existing blight to be redressed, it necessarily follows that, if the city later acquires those powers, it cannot exercise them to condemn property that is not blighted solely to prevent some unidentifiable ‘future blight’ that may never even materialize.
The court held that the threat of future blight could not serve to satisfy the public use clause of the Fifth Amendment and, consequently, any taking of the plaintiff’s leasehold for Costco’s private use would be unconstitutional.
Manufactured Housing Communities of
The Washington Supreme Court held that a statute
giving mobile home park residents the right of first refusal when the park
owner decides to sell the property constituted a taking for private use. The right of first refusal was a “fundamental
attribute of ownership” which the statute destroyed, resulting in a regulatory
Housing & Redevelopment Authority v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc.
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s jurisdictional holding that the transfer of title in a quick-take proceeding did not render a case moot because the property could be returned to the condemnee, however because the court was evenly split on the issues of public purpose and necessity (one member did not consider the case) the court left the appellate court’s decision undisturbed. 
Ltd. Partnership v.
The Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA) condemned the appellants’ property ostensibly for the purpose of providing a park-and-ride facility for car-poolers. The appellants sought relief in the trial court challenging the MTA’s authority to take the property and its motives. The trial court dismissed each count of the appellants’ complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of three counts alleging that the MTA had acted in bad faith. The appellants contended that the MTA concealed the fact that the primary purpose of the taking was to provide access to a private development. The appellate court concluded that the appellants’ complaint alleged sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss. Among other things, the appellants alleged that the MTA was aware that the property was too small to accomplish its public purpose and that the MTA had bypassed its usual procedural safeguards associated with takings. The court held that a taking made in bad faith was invalid and that the appellants would be entitled to relief “on a showing that the property was taken solely or dominantly to benefit a private party owning adjacent property. . .” The MTA could not avoid that result by devoting a portion of the property to a park-and-ride location.
v. City of
A federal district court applying Kentucky law determined that the city had acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in designating an area known as Gateway West as a redevelopment area (in an unpublished opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit vacated and remanded on jurisdictional grounds). The city’s comprehensive plan envisioned hotel and business uses in the area. Designation of the area as a redevelopment area would have facilitated development of the area as a whole. Under the applicable statutes, before designating a redevelopment area, the city was required to make findings of blight, housing shortages, expected alleviation of housing shortages through condemnation, and conditions constituting a “menace to the public health, safety, and welfare.” Residents of the area challenged the designation asserting that their neighborhood was no different than other neighborhoods in the city. The court determined that there was no substantial evidence supporting any of the statutorily required findings and that the evidence actually indicated that none of the required conditions existed.
discussing the need for substantial evidence, the court stated that “
If public use were construed to mean that the public would be benefited in the sense that the enterprise or improvement for the use of which the property was taken might contribute to the comfort or convenience of the public, or a portion thereof, or be esteemed necessary for their enjoyment, there would be absolutely no limit on the right to take private property. It would not be difficult for any person to show that a factory or hotel or like improvement he contemplated erecting or establishing would result in benefit to the public, and under this rule the property of the citizen would never be safe from invasion.
The court concluded that the statute authorizing the acquisition of blighted areas was “an inappropriate vehicle to accomplish the City’s goals. . .” and held that the development area declaration was void.
The city says it will condemn the land for Costco’s use. Among other things, the church has Congress on its side through the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), which is ostensibly designed to somewhat level the land use playing field for religious organizations’ use of church property. The act prohibits regulation that places a “substantial burden” on the practice of religion.
Stay tuned, because you can be assured that “public purpose,” “public use,” “blight,” and “necessity,” together with the affect of RLUIPA, will be in the further litigation mix.
City of Clearwater, Florida, wanted to establish a Community Redevelopment Area
pursuant to § 163.330 et seq., Fla.
Some of the lessons to be learned from the cases and alterations in philosophy and concepts might be:
That the real estate transactional lawyer spearheading the “deal” must construct a development team for the private sector players that includes land use and eminent domain expertise at the outset of the negotiations with the public sector players.
That a “common sense” assumption that the project will pass “public purpose,” “public use,” or “necessity” muster may prove to be an exercise in uninformed naiveté.
That the initial, perhaps irrational, exuberance that because government is a co-engineer in the engine cab of the redevelopment train means that the deal “has to” come to fruition is frequently misplaced.
That one man’s “blight” or “slum” may be another’s beauty.
There is still plenty of room for creative counsel with good
ideas. The doors to the law of redevelopment and takings
seems to be opening rather than closing.
To paraphrase Yogi, when you get to the fork in “
(In order of chronological compatibility with textual material listed in Table of Contents)
Cartoon by Tom Tomorrow........................................................................................................ A
Petition for Certiorari pending before the U.S. Supreme
Respondent’s Brief in Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari
Amicus Brief of International Municipal Lawyers Association
City’s Implementation of Its Land Assembly Action............................................................. J
 Nothing contained in this paper shall be construed as legal advice. The author reserves the right to assert positions contrary to those stated in this paper.
For a survey of recent baseball stadium financing projects in
 This paper will deal with some of the challenges in achieving land assemblage; however, it will not deal with the tactical challenges, such as forming multiple acquiring entities, dealing with various real estate brokers, and other measures used to acquire parcels under different ownership. Nor will the role played by a variety of financing mechanisms such as ad valorem tax abatement, tax increment financing, special assessment districts, bonding, be detailed, notwithstanding that even if one can control the land, no project goes anywhere unless financially feasible for both the public and private participants.
For an article with a State of Washington perspective on pre-condemnation planning and consolidated trials regarding projects involving the acquisition of multiple parcels, see Smith, Eminent Domain Litigation: Multiple Property Consolidated Trials and Pre-Condemnation Planning, The Urban Lawyer, Summer 2000, Vol. 32, No. 3, pages 479-506, published by the ABA Section of State and Local Government.
Adams v. Housing Authority of City of
 The terms “eminent domain” and “condemnation” will be used interchangeably in this paper.
See §§ 73.071, 73.091, and 73.092,
 For a more comprehensive review of this subject, see, 2A Nichols on Eminent Domain, Chapter 7, §§7.01-7.04 (Rev. 3d Ed. 1996). See also, Edward McKirdy, The New Eminent Domain: Public Use Defense Vanishing in Wake of Growing Privatization of Power, 155 N.J. L. J. 1145 (1999), as well as the writings listed in the Bibliography appended hereto.
 See “This Modern World” by Tom Tomorrow, appended hereto.
 Professor George Lefcoe, in Finding the Blight That’s Right for California Redevelopment Law, 52 Hastings L. Jour. 991, 994 (2001), observed that so-called “blighted” land is really in a condition to be characterized as “blight that’s right,” i.e., “places just bad enough to provide an excuse, however flimsy, for clearance, but good enough to attract developers.”
 For example, Article X, Section 6, of the Florida Constitution, restricts the exercise of the power of eminent domain to the condemnation of private property only for public purposes and, although a particular project may have a public purpose, one also needs to determine if there is a public necessity to acquire the property through condemnation (public purpose is concerned with the quality and nature of the project, whereas public necessity focuses on a determination of which property and how much of that property is needed for the project).
 Chapter 166 of the Florida Statutes enumerates the powers delegated to certain
9 (b) The governing body of a municipality may expend public funds to attract and retain business enterprises, and the use of public funds toward the achievement of such economic development goals constitutes a public purpose. The provisions of this chapter which confer powers and duties on the governing body of a municipality, including any powers not specifically prohibited by law which can be exercised by the governing body of a municipality, shall be liberally construed in order to effectively carry out the purposes of this subsection.
(c) For the purposes of this subsection, it constitutes a public purpose to expend public funds for economic development activities, including, but not limited to, developing or improving local infrastructure, issuing bonds to finance or refinance the cost of capital projects for industrial or manufacturing plants, leasing or conveying real property, and making grants to private enterprises for the expansion of businesses existing in the community or the attraction of new businesses to the community.
(d) Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed as a limitation on the home rule powers granted by the State Constitution for municipalities.
Excerpts from the
392 So. 2d 875, 886 (
572 N.E.2d 966 (
 821 P.2d 1067 (Okl. App. 1989).
 812 S.W.2d 903 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
 809 S.W. 2d 64 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
60 So. 2d 663 (
 652 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
725 So. 2d 530, 536 (
811 So. 2d 727, 733 (
695 So. 2d 672 (
768 N.E.2d 1 (
790 A. 2d 1178 (
790 A.2d 1167 (
 776 A.2d 821, 822 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
775 A.2d 284 (
767 A.2d 1154 (
99 Cents Only Stores, 2001
 13 P.3d 183 (
 2002 N.J. LEXIS 764 (N.J. 2002).
 630 N.W.2d 662 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
641 N.W.2d 885 (
 747 N.E.2d 707 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001).
 69 F. Supp. 2d 908 (E.D. Ky. 1999), vacated and remanded on jurisdictional grounds, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2490 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2001) (the 6th Circuit emphasized the importance of an explanation from the district court regarding the basis of federal jurisdiction when the district court does not reach the merits of the federal claim. Since no explanation was given, the court vacated and remanded “for further elaboration on the district court’s basis for jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s §1983 claim”).
No reporter cite is available. See, the
1976 decision of the California Supreme Court in Sweetwater Civic Ass’n v. City of National City, 18 Ca. 3d 270
(1976) where the court stated, “One man’s land cannot be seized by the
Government and sold to another man merely in order that the purchaser may build
upon it a better house or a house which better meets the Government’s idea of
what is appropriate or well designed. .
. .[The powers of redevelopment and eminent domain]
never can be used just because the public agency considers that it can make
better use or planning of an area than its present use of plan.” See also, Regus v. City of Baldwin Park, 70 Cal.App.3d 968 (1977); Friends of Mammoth v. Town of